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I. BACKGROUND
 
Article 17 of the Geneva Convention of 1949,
 
Relative To Th,e Treatment Of Prisoners Of War stated that,
 
"No physical violence or mental torture, nor any other
 
form of coercion may be inflicted on prisoners of war to
 
secure from them information of any kind whatsoever.
 
Prisoners of war who refuse to answer may not be threat
 
ened, insulted, or exposed to unpleasant or disadvantageous
 
1
 
treatment of any kind." There were three countries
 
that did not sign the document: the United States, North
 
p
 
Korea, and China.
 
The Korean War
 
On July 1, 1950, a C-54 landed in the Republic of
 
Korea carrying the first contingent of American troops.
 
This.was in response to the North Korean invasion of South
 
Korea on June 25, of that year. The troops went directly
 
from a peacetime setting to war, without any political
 
1
 
Eugene Kinkead, In Every War But One (Westport:
 
Greenwood Press, Publishers, 1959), p. 111.
 
^Ibid, p. 118.
 
justification for their involvement.
 
The fighting during the next two months was heavy,
 
with virtually no POWs taken by the North Korean People's
 
Army (NKPA). They treated captured American soldiers
 
inhumanely, resorting to torture and murder. It was
 
common to find captured servicemen with their hands bound
 
behind their backs with a bullet through their heads.^
 
During this time. General Douglas MacArthur, the Commander
 
In Chief Of United Nations Forces, Korea, was asked to
 
hold off the NKPA until units could be activated for action
 
in Korea. After much fighting with little success, the
 
United Nations (U.N.) detachment found itself in trouble
 
around the port of Pusan.5 On September 15, forces
 
which had been staging in Japan made an amphibious landing
 
at Inchon (near Seoul), deep in the enemy's rear. At the
 
same time, the troops holding the perimeter at Pusan made
 
a big offensive push, which succeeded in trapping the NKPA
 
Samuel B. Griffith, The Chinese People's
 
Liberation Army (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company,
 
1967), pp. 114-115; U.S. Secretary Of Defense, The Report
 
Of The Secretary Of Defense's Advisory Committee On
 
Prisoners Of War, POW: The Fight Continues After The
 
Battle, August 1955, p. 7.
 
4
 
David Detzler, Thunder Of The Captains (New York;
 
Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1977), p. 191.
 
5

Edgar 0. Ballance, Korea: 1950-1953 (Connecticut;
 
Archon Books, 1969), pp. 36-47.
 
  
between the two forces. This bold move, combined with
 
constant air and naval strikes, broke up the North Korean
 
advance, and sent them fleeing back across the 38th
 
fi/T
 
parallel. On October 1, 1950, MacArthur asked General
 
Kim II Sung, North Korea's Chairman of the Military
 
Council, for his surrender.
 
The response to MacArthur's request came not from
 
Kim II Sung, but from China. In a radio broadcast from
 
Peking, the United States was accused of entering Korea
 
with the purpose to "expand its aggression in the East,"
 
and due to this fact was seen to be a "most dangerous foe
 
to the People's Republic Of China." They also hinted that
 
if United Nations Forces8 crossed the 38th parallel, China
 
Q
 
would enter the war.
 
By October 9, U.N. troops had advanced as far as
 
100 miles north of the parallel. The Chinese again issued
 
Alexander L. George, The Chinese Communist Army
 
In Action. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967),
 
p. 1.
 
■ 7The 38th parallel (north latitude) was a dividing 
line as stipulated by Japan's surrender in World War II; 
the Russians controlled north of the parallel while the 
United States controlled south of the parallel. 
8
 
The term "United Nations Forces" refers to United
 
States troops unless otherwise specified.
 
9 ■ . ■ ■ ■ 
Griffith, The Chinese People's Liberation Army,
 
pp. 118-119. " ~~~ ~ ^ ^
 
a warning. They stated that they "could not 'stand idly
 
by' in the face of the 'serious situation' created by the
 
10
invasion of Korea." Washington chose to ignore this
 
message, with the State Department concluding that "Chinese
 
11
 intervention in Korea was unlikely."
 
In late October, reports began filtering in indi
 
cating a large number of Chinese troops massing and moving
 
in North Korea. These troops had been deployed from South
 
and Central China to Shantung and Manchuria just north of
 
12
 
the China-North Korea border as early as April, 1950.
 
There were three reasons that those reports were, for the
 
most part, ignored:
 
1. 	The State Department's belief that.
 
Chinese intervention was unlikely,^
 
2. 	The Chinese moved mostly at night,
 
hiding in tunnels and villages during
 
the day, and often set forest fires for
 
screening against air reconnaissance,
 
which left, no overt signs of a moving
 
^°Ibid, p. 121.
 
11
 
U.S., Congress, Senate, Hearings Before The
 
Committee On Armed Services And The Committee On Foreign
 
Relations, Military Situation In The Far East, 82nd Cong.,
 
IstYsess., 1951, p. 1933*
 
12
 
Griffith, The Chinese People's Liberation Army,
 
13
 
U.S., Congress, Senate, Military Situation In
 
The Far East, p. 1933,
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army, and,
 
3. 	Most of the reports came from peasant
 
or Givilian sources.^5 ^
 
Even with the taking of Chinese prisoners, the U.N. Command
 
and 	the State Department would not change their
 
positions. On November 2, the;U^S/ Army Third/ I
 
Battalion of the Eighth Cavalry Regiment was surrounded
 
by the Chinese, sustained many dasualtiea, and be,came
 
ineffective as a fighting force.l^ The Chinese had
 
officially entered the war.
 
Meeting the Chinese for the first time with their
 
defenses down caused the U.N. forces to look upon their
 
enemy in unrealistic terms. Due to the aggressiveness and
 
the 	"human waye" tactics used by the Chinese soldiers, they
 
were seen as "drug crazed fanatics" who could care less
 
about their own lives, let alone the lives of others.1 R
 
The 	effect was that the Chinese were seen as an all­
■ 14 ■ 
Matthew B. Ridgeway, The Korean War (New York:
 
Doubleday and Company, jnc., 19b7), p. 52.
 
lbid,, p., 52.
 
""^Ibid, p. 51. •
 
17. • 	 .

Griffith, The Chinese People's Liberation Army,
 
■PP;. - .1;32-133. 
■■ ■ ■ ■ 'IS-
George, The Chinese Communist Army In Action, 
p. 2, ■. ^ 	 ~ 
powerful enemy, who could not be beaten. They did not wait
 
long to show their civilized side. This was through their
 
initial treatment of POWs.
 
On November 22, the Chinese released twenty-seven
 
severely wounded men to U.S. forces. This came as a shock
 
to the U.N. Command, since they were accustomed to the
 
NKPA's killing POWs. The soldiers were released after
 
being treated with kindness and sympathy, and it was found
 
that many Chinese soldiers shared their meager rations with
 
the prisoners. The wounded soldiers were told to pass on
 
news of their favorable treatment, with instructions to
 
"urge them all [their comrades] to 'turn their guns against
 
officers' and thus free themselves from the oppression...
 
1Q/20

victims of capitalism (sic) suffered." The first
 
attack on the minds of the servicemen was somewhat weak,
 
but was an indication of things to come.
 
The NKPA, it must be recalled, had a history of
 
maltreating POWs by torture or murder; the Chinese, on the
 
other hand, employed a more humane policy. Soon after the
 
Chinese policy was enacted, radio broadcasts and Communist­
19Ridgeway, The Korean War, pp, 58-59.
 
20
 
When released, these individuals also carried
 
them propaganda leaflets. Examples of these and other
 
leaflets are in Appendix 1. Source: Charles J. Nilsson,
 
LTC, U.S. Army Retired, Assistant G-3, 2nd Infantry
 
Division, Korea 1950-1951, personal collection.
 
inspired writings authored by American POWs began pouring
 
out of North Korea.21 The mystery as to why these actions
 
were taking place remained until Operation Little Switch
 
(April 1953), in which 149 sick and wounded POWs were
 
repatriated, and Operation Big Switch (August-September
 
1953), in which 3,323 were returned.22 Once the statis
 
tics were out, the American people were shocked: it was
 
reported that approximately 38 percent of the POWs died in
 
captivity, and roughly one out of every three Americans
 
collaborated with the enemy at one time or another. More
 
over, not one soldier successfully escaped from a permanent
 
camp, and for the first time in history, twenty-one
 
Americans refused to return home and decided to stay with
 
23
 
the enemy. It was only after the U.S. Army and a team
 
of psychiatrists who studied and evaluated the returnees
 
that the basis for this peculiar behavior was labeled.
 
The word that was on the lips of all Americans was
 
24

"brainwashing."
 
21
Edward Hunter, Brainwashing: From Pavlov To
 
Powers (New York: The Bookmaker, 1962), p. 10.
 
22

Kinkead, In Every War But One, p. 39.
 
^^Ibid, pp. 16-17.
 
24

The term "brainwashing" will be used throughout
 
this study wherever a general term applies. For other
 
terms see Appendix 2.
 
8 
Brainwashing, or hai hao (wash brain), was the
 
unofficial name of the process that the Chinese Communists
 
used for "mind reform and re-education" of the people in
 
China. The term was used in Red China only among trusted
 
friends or when a cadre25 member would lose his temper
 
.26

and tell someone, "what you need is a good brain-wash."
 
At about the time that the U.N. forces had the NKPA
 
on the run, the term was first put into print in the United
 
States in an article published in the Miami Daily News.
 
The author was Edward Hunter (a journalist and it was not
 
known until recently), a Central Intelligence Agency
 
27
 
employee.
 
Hunter was stationed in Hong Kong in the late
 
1940's when he first came into contact with the Chinese
 
thought reform program. He interviewed many men and women
 
who had been through the process and were leaving China for
 
25
 
Here cadre refers to the mediator between the
 
Communist Party, the State, and the masses. The term can
 
also refer to all party members at the lower levels. See
 
R. L. Walker, China Under Communism (London: Allen And
 
Unwin, 1956) p. 51.
 
26

Hunter, Brainwashing: From Pavlov To Powers,
 
p. 3.
 
27
Alan W. Scheflin and Edward M. Opton, The Mind
 
Manipulators (New York: Paddington Press, LTD, 1978),
 
p. 87.
 
28
good. He found that brainwashing was the norm for
 
all men, women, and children who belonged to one of two
 
groups: foreigners or Chinese with "questionable baok­
grounds."29 "Before anyone could be considered trust
 
worthy, he was subjected to brain-washing...Only then did
 
on
 
the authorities consider that he could be depended upon."-'
 
This line of thought stems from the Chinese Communist's
 
belief that "all people retain ideological poisons" from
 
their previous society, with this poison needing removal in
 
order for the citizen to be able to take his place in the
 
31

"new society." This action of removing the poison is
 
described by Hunter:
 
The intent is to change a mind so radically so
 
that its owner becomes a living puppet-a human
 
robot-without the atrocity being visible from the
 
outside. The aim is to create a mechanism In
 
flesh and blood, with new beliefs and new thought
 
processes inserted into a captive body. What
 
that amounts to is the search for a slave race
 
that, unlike the slaves of olden times, can be
 
trusted never to revolt, always to be amenable to
 
28

Hunter, Brainwashing: From Pavlov To Powers,
 
p. 6.
 
29Scheflin and Opton, The Mind Manipulators, p. 88.
 
30
 
Edward Hunter, Brainwashing In Red China: The
 
Calculated Destruction Of Men's Minds (New York: Vanguard
 
Press, Inc., 1951), p. 4.
 
31

T. H. Pear:, The Moulding Of Modern Man, (London:
 
Allen and Unwin, 1961), p. 121.
 
10 
orders, like an insect to its instincts. The
 
intent is to atomize humanity.^^
• ,
 
Hunter saw this "intent to atomize humanity" as a real
 
threat to Americans and free people everywhere. In
 
response to this perceived threat, the facts presented
 
above became the basis for his first book, Brainwashing In
 
Red 	China.
 
The purpose of Brainwashing In Red China has been
 
described as three-fold, with only the first two being
 
important to this study:
 
1. 	To warn the American public of the
 
"spreading cancer of oriental
 
Communism,"^3
 
2. 	To look at Mao Tse-tungs attempts to
 
re-educate the people of Red China
 
through brainwashing and to condemn
 
those attempts, and
 
3. 	To aid the CIA in gaining American
 
support for covert operations by
 
scaring them into a belief of some-_p­
thing mysterious going on in China.
 
Although Hunter recognized the threat, his warning was not
 
heeded. Someone once said that to be fore-warned is to be
 
o2
 
Scheflin and Opton, The Mind Manipulators, p. 87.
 
^^Ibid, p. 23.
 
34
 
Hunter, Brainwashing: From Pavlov To Powers,
 
p. 3.
 
35Scheflin and Opton, The Mind Manipulators,
 
p. 226.
 
■ ■ ■' : tV 
fore-armed. It has been suggested that if fore-warned,
 
the POWs might have fared better in Korea. After
 
repatriation, the question asked again and again was, "Why
 
wasn't I told." For those who were not told and captured,'
 
the war was not over—-it was also to be waged in the POW
 
camp., ■ ■ ■ 
Such was the situation confronting American ground
 
troops in 1950. They were vulnerable to Chinese brain
 
washing techniques for the following reasons: first, they
 
were sbldiers of a;peacetime army thrown into battle with
 
no information about their foe or reasons for being in
 
Korea. Second, due; tof^e Sggi^sssiveness of the Chinese
 
soldier, it was assumed that all POWs would be murdered as
 
the NKPA had done; when given a reprieve, the psychological
 
impact was staggering. Third, even though Hunter had
 
published works on the dangers of the Chinese brainwashing
 
program at the same time that broadcasts and written
 
propaganda were coming from the POW camps, no one paid any
 
attention to his warnings. Consequently, the American
 
soldiers were hot prepared for what confronted them when
 
Of.
 
L. J. West, "Psychiatric Aspects Of Training
 
For Honorable Survival As A Prisoner Of War," American
 
Journal Of Psychiatry 115 (1958): pp. 334-3361 Virginia
 
Pasley, 21 Stayed, (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Cudahy,
 
1955), pp. 242-243; William E. Mayer, "Why Did Many GI
 
Captives Cave In?," U.S. News & World Report (February
 
24, 1956): p. 57; Hunter, Brainwashing: From Pavlov To
 
Powers, pp. 6, 16; Kinkead, In Every War But One, p. 12.
 
12 
they became POWs. Finally, one must recall that China and
 
North Korea did not sign the Geneva Convention of 19^9, and
 
therefore were not legally bound by the Convention's
 
"rules" for the treatment of POWs.
 
II. BRAINWASHING: SOME DEFINITIONS
 
According to Edward Hunter, the reason for the
 
popularity of the term "brainwashing" was due to the fact
 
that "a vacuum in language existed...it described a
 
■37 
strategy that had yet no name." J. A. M. Merloo went 
further and stated that "to name an object is to bring it 
within the sphere of human control...without a name it 
Q Q 
arouses fear, because it is unknown." Once given the 
name "brainwashing," it was initially used to describe the 
process of thought reform used by the Chinese on their 
people, but it soon spread to other Communist block 
countries approaches to thought reform as well. "It was 
not long before anything the Communists did anywhere was 
labeled as brainwashing."39 As stated above however, it 
was with the return of the POWs from Korea that put the 
word in the dictionary and in the minds of the people of 
the world. With this rise in popularity, many writers have 
37Hunter, Brainwashing: From Pavlov To Powers, 
p. 3. 
^^Ibid, p. 4. 
39
Robert J. Lifton, Thought Reform And The 
Psychology Of Totalism (New York: W. W. Norton and Company,
Inc., 1961), p. 3. > 
u
 
presented various definitions of brainwashing. Therefore,
 
it would be helpful at this stage to review these defini
 
tions with the purpose of arriving at_a single definition
 
which at best describes what took place in China during the
 
Communist takeover in 1948, and in the Korean POW camps
 
during the 1950's. A definition which centers on the
 
brainwashing of groups will help the reader better under
 
stand the information presented in this paper.
 
Edward Hunter defined brainwashing as a technique
 
whereby "actual damage was done to a man's mind through
 
drugs, hypnotism, or other means so that a memory of what
 
actually happened would be wiped out of his mind and a new
 
40
 
memory of what never happened inserted." This definition
 
was acceptable in 1950, given the limited knowledge of the
 
subject and psychology of the day. Today, it has been
 
criticized because it insinuates that a memory can be
 
totally erased. Based on the information obtained from
 
the Korean POWs, we now know that it is scientifically
 
impossible to completely erase one's memories, and that
 
past memories are still vivid; they have merely been
 
suppressed. In Korea, one must also remember that there
 
was no documentation which indicated that drugs or hypnosis
 
were used on the prisoners.
 
40

Scheflin and Opton, The Mind Manipulators, p. 86.
 
  
- - ■■ ■ . . 15;; 
In contrast to Hunter's definition. The Random
 
House Dictionary Of The English Language describes
 
brainwashing as "a method of systematically changing
 
attitudes Or altering beliefs, originated In totalitarian
 
countries, esp. through the use of torture, drpgs, or
 
■ - :4l' ' 
psychological stress techniques."
 
This definition, as with Hunter's, is inadequate
 
due to the references to drugs and hypnosis. Furthermore,
 
It states that it;originated In totalitarian countries,
 
which Is not true. It has been traced back to Ancient
 
Greece, a democracy, and was used In the rites of
 
priestS:^ . 
> Alhh. Schef^ on the other hand, sees brainwashing 
as an ideological that takes place "when a 
person has been compelled to believe subjectively a set of 
principles originally alien to him. Furthermore, the 
means...must have beenaggrSsslve or violent, otherwise... 
education or advertising would be brainwashing." ■ 
This definition is more appropriate for the 
purpose of this siudy. It eliminates from considera,tlon 
41'■■ ■■" 
The Random House Dictionary Of The English
Language, unab. ed. (1971), s.v. "brainwashing." 
hp
William Sargant, Battle-For The Mind (Garden
City: Doubleday and Company"^ Inc., 1957), pp. 178-182. 
43" . .' ■
Scheflln and Optoh, The Mind Manipulators
pp* 85-86. 
16 
advertising, education, and other forms of persuasion in
 
our society as nothing more than brainwashing. More
 
importantly, it brings to light the fact that ideological
 
conversion is the objective of the process, which has been
 
44

stated by many others as well. Scheflin's definition,
 
although an improvement on Hunter's, is still not fully
 
suitable for the purpose of this paper.
 
Robert Merloo, in his book Rape Of The Mind, coined
 
the term "menticide" to describe the brainwashing process
 
as it has taken place through time. Menticide was derived
 
from "mens", meaning the mind, and "caedere", meaning to
 
45
kill. He sees brainwashing as a crime against the mind
 
originating from the days of torture in earlier times. It
 
differs from torture because in modern times it has a new
 
twist, which he has aptly named, "the refinement of the
 
46
 
rack." Merloo describes menticide as "an attack on
 
man's very mind, on his sovereign will and conviction.
 
It destroys free thought and makes servile, mechanical
 
44
 
For a detailed discussion of this matter see
 
pp. 77 to 81.
 
45
 
Merloo's idea for the term was taken from the
 
word genocide, which means the systematic killing of a
 
racial group.
 
46

J. A. M. Merloo, The Rape Of The Mind Cleveland:
 
The World Publishing Co., 1956), pp. 27-2b.
 
17 
217
 instruments of his inviolate thought process." After
 
being subjected to this process, the subject usually
 
conforms to the demands or requests of his interrogators.
 
Merloo further states that such a condition confuses those
 
interacting with the subject since the process involves
 
conflicting ideas and information. This leaves doubt as to
 
48
 
what is true or false and whom to believe or trust. This
 
last statement is very important to this study, as it
 
brings to light the effectp that brainwashing has on a
 
group.
 
Robert Lifton sees brainwashing as "thought
 
reform", and believes it comes from the Chinese word szu­
hsiang kai-tsao, which means ideological remoulding,
 
llQ
 
ideological reform, or thought reform. During a visit to
 
Hong Kong, he became involved in studying several individu
 
als who escaped from Mainland China and had been subjected
 
to the Chinese thought reform program. He hypothesized
 
after interviewing several who had been through the pro
 
gram, that what they had been through was a much more
 
47
Idem, "The Crime Of Menticide," American Journal
 
Of Psychiatry 107 (1951): p. 595.
 
48

Idem, The Rape Of The Mind, p. 28.
 
49

Lifton was one of a few psychiatrists involved in
 
the evaluation of POWs repatriated in Operation Big Switch
 
and Little Switch.
 
 18 
powerful, coraprehehsive, and effective program than the one
 
that the POWs went through. He saw both programs, however,
 
as bringing "into play a series of pressures and appeals—
 
intellectual, emotional, and physical—aimed at social
 
control and individual change." These pressures and
 
appeals use the group as social manipulators.50 Thus, the
 
group is not only affected by someone going through the
 
process (as Merloo indicates), but it also becomes an
 
instrument in the process.
 
Still another author, Edgar Schein, used the term
 
"coercive persuasion" to describe the process that American
 
civilians imprisoned in China were subjected to. He felt
 
that "what happened to the prisoners was that they were
 
subjected to unusually prolonged persuasion from which they
 
could not escape...they were coerced into allowing them­
selves to be persuaded."51 To Schein, this indicated that
 
a prisoner was not merely a passive recipient or informa
 
tion taker, but that he participated in the process, in
 
which a "genuine clash of beliefs and points of view were
 
52
 
involved." The result was an avoidance-avoidance
 
. 50
 
Lifton, Thought Reform And The Psychology Of
 
Totalism, p. 4.
 
5j.

Edgar Schein, Coercive Persuasion (New York:
 
W. W. Norton and Company'^ Inc., 19bO, p. 1«.
 
^^Ibid, p. 19.
 
19 
conflict, in which the prisoner was confronted by two or
 
(5-3
 
more undesirable alternatives. Consequently, in order to
 
survive he permitted himself to be persuaded.
 
It should be noted that the brainwashing process
 
retains its grip on the individual only as long as one is
 
in such an environment. Once free of this environment, one
 
does not generally practice those beliefs which were forced
 
upon him. In other words, the effects of brainwashing are
 
54
 
not permanent. This statement can be verified from the
 
behavior of the POWs who returned from Korea as well as 
by the American and Chinese civilian prisoners who were 
returned from China. ■ 
Therefore, after reviewing these definitions, for
 
the purpose of this paper brainwashing will be defined as
 
follows:
 
Brainwashing is an attempt at ideological
 
conversion which tries to get a group to believe 
subjectively something that is alien to them. 
The process must be violent or aggressive in 
nature, and consists of intellectual, emotional,
 
and physical pressures. The results are that the
 
victims conform, as there are not acceptable
 
alternatives left open to them. This leaves
 
doubt as to what is true and false, with conflict
 
as to who to believe or trust. The process fails
 
53

Audrey Haber and Richard P. Runyon, Fundamentals
 
Of Psychology (Reading: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company,
 
1974), pp. 426-427.'
 
54
 
Jacques Ellul, Propaganda: The Formation Of Men's
 
Attitudes (Toronto: Knopf'J Random, 1965), pT 313; Merloo,
 
The Rape Of The Mind, p. 34.
 
20 
if the individual leaves the sterile brainwashing
 
environment.
 
With this definition in mind, the Communist methods
 
of brainwashing used on the people of China and American
 
servicemen captured in Korea and held by the Chinese will
 
be explored.
 
III. BRAINWASHING IN CHINA AND NORTH KOREA
 
The Application Of Brainwashing In China
 
The Communist Party Reform Movement of 1942-1944
 
laid the groundwork for China's future. Since they had
 
been greatly influenced by the Soviet Union, the Reform
 
Movement centered around the thoughts of Marx and Lenin.
 
It was for this reason that China's thought reform program
 
(also known as brainwashing) was derived from Russia'as
 
55

well.^^
 
The Civil War between the Chinese Communists and
 
Chiang K'ai-shek's Nationalists was taking place when the
 
Russian Secret Police intervened on the side of the
 
Communists. Since it was in their best interests that the
 
Nationalists be defeated, they taught their secret tech4
 
niques of brainwashing to the Communists in order to help
 
them win the minds of the people. Its existence in Russia
 
was not well known due to the fact that when it was put to
 
use on an individual, once they got what they wanted out of
 
him, he was eliminated. In China, however, the process
 
could not be hidden because those subjected were not
 
eliminated (with the target group being all of China,
 
55Walker, China Under Communism, pp. 54-55.
 
22 
instead of a few individuals as in Russia). The large
 
scale application of such a process was difficult to keep
 
secret.
 
This thought reform program was in use throughout
 
China when Mao Tse-tung became the Chairman of the
 
Communist Party in 19^9. He continued its use because he
 
felt that all man's possessions belonged to the Chinese
 
57

Communist Party, including his mind. Mao's policy on
 
brainwashing is best described in the following statement:
 
to integrate individuals into the new body
 
politic as deeply as possible, and, at the same
 
time, to detach them from the old groups, such as
 
the family or traditional village organizations.
 
These groups must be disintegrated, always
 
through action from within.58
 
This statement shows that Mao Tse-tung's use of
 
brainwashing had as its objective the breaking down of
 
group cohesion. It should follow therefore, that the
 
extent and quality of this group breakdown would be the key
 
to its success. This was, in fact, the method used by the
 
Chinese Communists in their quest for control during their
 
Civil War (and which was later used in the Korean War). A
 
56

Hunter, Brainwashing: From Pavlov To Powers,
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Peter Carter, Mao (London: Oxford University
 
Press, 1967), p. 127.
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more comprehensive explanation on Chinese brainwashing is
 
contained in the The Wang Report.
 
Wang Tsun-ming was an anti-Communists counter­
intelligence officer with Chiang K'ai-shek from 1946 to
 
1950. His work dealt with studying the "Communist methods
 
for seizing and consolidating power over communities and
 
over groups of people. Upon capture in 1950 by
 
Communist forces, he was subjected to the very process he
 
had been observing for four years. After a year of this
 
brainwashing, he was sent to Korea as a private to fight
 
the Americans. Upon arriving in North Korea, he made
 
his way to American forces; not to fight them, but to
 
surrender. His information on the Communist's methods of
 
brainwashing as applied to groups is the subject of a U.S.
 
Army study entitled. The Wang Report. The highlights of
 
that report are described below.
 
In his debriefing with U.S. intelligence officers
 
in 1953, Wang began by stating that when a village was
 
singled out for Communist takeover, the total process
 
would usually take about eight months. In the beginning,
 
soldiers would move into the Village, share simple slogans
 
and new ideas, and help the villagers in their work. Their
 
purpose during this "helping period" was not to convert
 
59Kinkead, In Every War But One, p. 89.
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people to Communism (though at times it did), but to
 
discover all they could about the village, the people in
 
it, and how the town interacted with surrounding villages.
 
Upon learning all they needed to know, they
 
approached the town "undesirables" and informed them that
 
they were to become the town leaders. These future leaders
 
were called "progressives" by the Communists. A town
 
meeting was then called, with the progressives planted
 
among the villagers with instructions to present grievances
 
against the upper class. These rich were accused of
 
exploitation of the people for their own selfish gains, and
 
were then forced to confess such "crimes" publicly. The
 
progressives would not accept the confessions of the rich,
 
and would beat them and accuse others in the audience of
 
exploitation as well. Subsequently, the Communists then
 
turned the poor farmers against the progressives, and
 
consequently more accusations and more confessions took
 
place. With this growing confusion and anomie among the
 
villagers, all of the farms were confiscated by the
 
Communists and the land redistributed. The best land was
 
given to those who would further the Communist cause once
 
the soldiers left the area. With this, the group was on
 
its way to total disorganization and breakdown, as Wang
 
went on to show.
 
The final act was to bind the people back together
 
as one under Communism. They accomplished this by forcing
 
25 
a randomly picked man who had caused trouble during the
 
takeover, to confess to "crimes" during a village meeting.
 
Those given the best land (seen as the "new progressives"),
 
were strategically placed throughout the crowd to aid in
 
fostering hostility toward the victim by the villagers.
 
The result would be that the whole town—men, women, and
 
children--would take part in beating the man to death.
 
With everyone taking part in the killing, they would thus
 
be "bound to each other and to Communism by a common stigma
 
of blame.
 
The emphasis of Wang's report centered on the
 
Communists strategy of creating chaos, disorganization, and
 
anomie within the village. "They were not satisfied with
 
turning class against class; they went inside of each
 
family, to turn individuals against each other and so
 
loosen irreparably the cement that held together the class
 
51
itself." The village's conversion to Communism was
 
therefore seen as the result of the total breakdown in
 
group cohesion.
 
The Application Of Brainwashing In Korea
 
In relationship to the above, while looking at
 
^"^Ibid, p. 89-94.
 
^^Ibid, p. 91-94.
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this process as it was applied in the Chinese controlled
 
prisoner of war camps in North Korea, one might keep in
 
mind the following statements made by Colonel Willis A.
 
Perry, at the time of the prisoner's repatriation one of
 
the intelligence officers responsible for security matters
 
of the returning POWs. He believed that:
 
The principles used to undermine and weaken our
 
men and their relationships were basically the
 
same as those used in China except that
 
psychological' pressures replaced the physical
 
ones....In China, the Communists were seeking to
 
purge reactionary elements and to redistribute
 
the land; in the prison camps, their goals were
 
to isolate reactionaries and redistribute
 
ideas...They could not obtain these results with
 
beatings, torture, and death...If the Communists
 
had tortured or killed our men, their buddies 
would have banded together in a unified way to 
resist their captors.62 
As we shall see, the Chinese would not give the prisoners
 
this opportunity to unite.
 
The application of the Chinese techniques of brain­
washing in the North Korean POW camps has been summarized
 
by many writers.64 For the most part, they all agree on
 
^^Ibid, pp. 94, 102.
 
Throughout this paper, North Korean POW ckmps
 
will refer soley to those controlled by the Chinese unless
 
otherwise specified.
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Edgar H. Schein, "The Chinese Indoctrination
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27 
what the soldier experienced while in enemy hands. There
 
fore, for the purpose of this paper I will rely mostly on
 
Schein's work, "The Chinese Indoctrination Program For
 
Prisoners Of War," as he goes into much greater detail than
 
the others. However, reference will also be made to others
 
when it becomes necessary to fill in gaps or to make a
 
point clearer. The following summary thus represents the
 
average experience of the American Army POW in Korea, and
 
will show that the breakdown of group cohesion was a key
 
element in the Chinese techniques of brainwashing.
 
The soldiers who were taken prisoner in Korea, did
 
not fit into any pattern as to how they fell into enemy
 
hands. Some were members of units that were surrounded or
 
overrun by the Chinese. Others were separated from their
 
units due to the shifting front that was common in Korea,
 
with these individuals soon finding American lines in their
 
rear. Consequently, many of these individuals (as well as
 
55
large combat elements), became POWs of the Chinese.
 
After being captured, the first few hours in the
 
Congress, House, Committee On Un-American Activities,
 
Communist Psychological Warfare (Brainwashing),
 
consultation with Edward Hunter, 85th Cong., 2nd sess.,
 
March 13, 1958, pp. 1-25; Albert D. Biderman, March To
 
Calumny (New York; The MacMillan Company, 1963); Mayer,
 
"Why Did Many GI Captives Cave In?," pp. 58-72.
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hands of the Chinese were frightening due to rumors that
 
had been spread throughout the units about the treatment
 
one could receive. The newly captured prisoner expected
 
torture and death; by not being killed outright however,
 
their fears of being killed were soon alleviated
 
After getting the prisoner away from the front
 
lines, the Chinese went to great lengths to show that they
 
were friendly and humane. They would meet their captives
 
with outstretched hands, offer them congratulations on
 
being released from the Capitalist bonds, and give them
 
food and cigarettes. Emphasis was put on the fact that
 
they were lucky not to have fallen into the hands of the
 
North Koreans, as they would not be alive. The prisoners
 
were repeatedly asked if they were for peace, as were the
 
Chinese. If they answered affirmatively, they were then
 
promised to be released if they "did well," "cooperated,"
 
68
 
and "learned the truth." This strategy had the effect
 
of elevating the enemy in the minds of the POWs. All of
 
the horror stories they had previously heard and believed
 
were obviously not true—the Chinese soldiers were kind and
 
^^Ibid, pp. 150-151.
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Kinkead, In Every War But One, p. 94.
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Schein, "The Chinese Indoctrination Program For
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a humane people. After gaining a little of the POW's trust
 
during this initital meeting, the mardh to the permanent
 
camp was begun. This jouhhey would take the prisoners
 
initially to temporary camps (which were not far from the
 
permanent camps) in order that the prisoners might rest,
 
while the guards could observe their reactions to their
 
' 69
 
ordeal (i.e. look for potential collaborators).
 
The conditions during the march to the camps took
 
their toll on the prisoners. As the Chinese had not
 
thought of how they were going to feed the prisoners during
 
the march, they usually had to buy what they could from
 
local villagers.. The food they bought was insufficient,
 
with the calorie content well below that of the soldier's
 
70

normal diet. In addition, the men were usually given
 
drinking water only once a day, therefore, to quench their
 
thirst, it was not uncommon for them to drink water found
 
in ditches or, if the season was Vight, to eat snow. Under
 
these conditions, the men soon began to suffer from
 
^^Ibid, p. 152.
 
70
 
The calorie content of what the men were getting
 
on the march and in the camps amounted:to between 800-1200
 
calories; they were accustomed to the Army combat ration of
 
3,500 calories. In addition, their diet was deficient in
 
proteins, minerals, and vitamins; see Kinkead, In Every War
 
But One, pp. 142-143.
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diarrhea, which left them in a very weak state. 
Due to the fact that all of the Chinese camps were 
on the China-North Korea border, the journey could be up to 
300 miles in length, depending on the location of the front 
■ ■ 72' 
and where captured. The columns moved only under the
 
cover of darkness (as daylight brought the fear of U.S. air
 
strikes), while averaging twenty miles per night. During
 
daylight halts, propaganda leaflets and Communist songs
 
were distributed, as was news of Chinese victories. After
 
allowing the priSohers time to read and digest this infor
 
mation, a discussion of the content followed. During this
 
period, anything that the prisoners wished to discuss could
 
also be bronght up. Many times the conditions of the
 
march, particularly the lack of food, was the subject of
 
these conversations. The Chinese would remind the POWs
 
that the Chinese soldiers were eating the same food, and
 
enduring the same hardships. Moreover, they were reminded
 
that the prisoners were allowed to keep their own clothing
 
7^
 
William Lindsey White, The Captives Of Korea (New
 
York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1957), pp. 46-4b.
 
72' • ■ ' ■ 
Biderman, March To Calumny, pp. 96, 202; see map 
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Schein states that not all men participated in 
these foot marches, however, it seemed, to be the norm; see 
Schein, "The Chinese Indoctrination Program For Prisoners 
Of.War," p. 151. 
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and were protected from the North Koreans and any guards
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who got too aggressive. Consequently, since they
 
were all going through bad times together, the POWs were
 
asked to hold on until they could get to the temporary
 
camps. Because of these hardships, "Lines of authority
 
tended to break down, and the prevailing attitude was
 
'every man for himself.' Open competition for food,
 
clothing, and shelter made the maintenance of group ties
 
■' 75 
almost impossible," The thought of better conditions 
at the temporary camps is what kept most POWs going. For 
many however, this was not enough and many perished during 
the march. 
For those who made it to the temporary camps, the 
conditions were actually worse than during the march. 
Disease, lack of food, and exposure to the elements took 
many lives. The lack of better treatment was blamed either 
on United Nations' air strikes (which the Chinese claimed 
destroyed much of the food in North Korea), or the failure 
74White disagrees with this point. In his example 
he showed the guards as brutal and being replaced every few 
days. As the norm seems to be as stated above, we will go 
with that interpretation, with the understanding that 
there were limited acts of brutality and ill treatment by
the guards; see White, The Captives Of Korea, pp. 46-49, 
75 
Schein, "The Chinese Indoctrination Program For 
Prisoners Of War," p. 151. ; 
"^^See Appendix 4 for Tables. 
 ' , . ' ■ ; 32; 
of the POWs to cooperate. Additionally, although prisoners 
were inadequately guarded in, these temporary camps, few 
attempts to escape were made. The reasons for this has 
been attributed to weakness due to the lack of proper food 
and rest, fear of capture by the North Koreans, and to the 
concept of every man for himself. Schein explains that, 
"It was difficult to maintain close group ties if one was 
competing with others for the essentials of life."77 It is 
therefore not surprising that the prisoners that reached 
the permanent camps were not only mentally and physically 
drained, but were lacking in group cohesion due to the 
inability to satisfy basic biological needs. 
The permanent FOW camps were usually part of a 
small village, separated by either man-made or natural 
barriers. The POWs permanent quarters consisted of mud 
huts, with straw matting to Sleep on. Other prominent 
buildings included a mess hall, latrine, Chinese officer 
and enlisted quarters, and a large building used for 
lectures and administrative purposes. The facilities were 
inadequate according to Schein, "but far better than in 
temporary camps." Furthermore, although guards and 
barriers were present, they were inadequate for the number 
77
 
Edgar H. Schein, "Reaction Patterns To Severe,
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of POWs in the oamp. The physical set-up was therefore not
 
a deterrent for anyone wishing to escape or venture into
 
78
 
the adjoining village.
 
Upon arrival at the permanent camp, the prisoners
 
were greeted by the senior interrogator of the camp. This
 
interrogator and his assistants were unique in that they
 
were well educated and could speak English fluently. Their
 
knowledge of the United States was extensive, and it has
 
been stated that "they were often so conversant with
 
American slang, and so knowledgeable about Stan Musial's
 
batting average or the landmarks along U.S. Highway No. 1,
 
that many of them might have just got off a plane from the
 
States.
 
The interrogator's job was to find out all he could
 
from the prisoner under the guise of friendship. The POWs
 
were all led to a room where they were asked to fill out a
 
form with heading of the International Red Cross. The
 
reason given for answering the approximately 140 questions
 
was to enable the Chinese to have enough information to
 
inform the U.S. Army, friends, and relatives that the
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prisoner was alive and well. The actual purpose of the
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form was to arrive at the prisonerVs socio-economic status
 
and to discover any weakness in the individual which could
 
■ 31. . ■ ■ ■ ' 
be exploited. "They sized up each prisbner's 
character to find out whether he carried a grudge against 
"82 
his superiors, his neighbors, or society in general." 
Through this and other means, the Chinese gathered "the 
largest fund of information about the American soldier ever 
acquired by hn enemy...Cthis] provided the Communist with
 
intelligence they could never have obtained from other
 
sources." The purpose of later interrogation was to
 
either gather information of military nature or to gain
 
further knowledge about the prisoner, both of which could
 
be used as instruments of blackmail in the future. What
 
ever the reason, the POW was always put in a situation
 
where if he lied, the interrogator would know it. For
 
example, the Chinese would call in the same prisoner for
 
days trying to get information about a piece of military
 
equipment. When the POW lied, he would go through the
 
confession as listed below. If he would say nothing, the
 
^''ibid, p. 95.
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U.S., Congress, House Communist Psychological
 
Warfare (Brainwashing), p. 16.
 
^^Kinkead, In Every War But One, pp. 115^116.
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interrogator might go as far as to move in with the
 
prisoner as a ploy to get him talking about anything.
 
After many days of this, the interrogator would call in the
 
prisoner and ask him the question again. With a lie or no
 
answer given, the interrogator would pull out the Army
 
Technical Manual on the piece of equipment, and read in
 
great deal the specifications he had been asking for.84
 
This has been referred to as the "deception" technique,8'S
 
and leads the individual to believe that the interrogator
 
knows the answers to his questions, so it saves him a lot
 
of time and he confesses by answering the questions
 
86

correctly. Questions regarding the prisoner's personal
 
history were already in the hands of the interrogator, who
 
was armed with the individual's Red Gross form (which was
 
previously mentioned). Any deviation from the information
 
on that form was used to discredit the soldier. In this
 
manner, the Communists determined who were good candidates
 
for brainwashing and, after being indoctrinated, would be
 
84
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useful to them in organizing the POW camp.
 
The organization of the camp followed the "company"
 
scheme which was familiar to the U.S. soldiers. In a
 
standard infantry company, there are four platoons, with
 
the platoons broken down into four squads. Each POW camp
 
had between three to seven of these companies, with approx
 
imately 200 men per company. Each company consisted of
 
three to four platoons which were broken into six squads,
 
R7
 
each squad having from six to fifteen POWs. The very
 
structure of the companies had the appearance of a military
 
unit, which consists of formal chains of command, rank
 
structure, etc.. The chain of command and rank structure,
 
however, were dominated by the Chinese. They put their own
 
people in charge of the companies and .platoon, with lower
 
ranking POWs as squad leaders. They meant to emphasize
 
that under Communism all were equal, and rank was unimpor
 
tant. Schein has described this policy as "a systematic
 
attempt to undermine the internal structure of the group
 
by removing its leaders...the noncommissioned officers,
 
who were at first in the enlisted camps, were put into a
 
special camp when the Chinese found out that they were
 
quite effective in keeping the other men from various kinds
 
of collaboration. It was reported that this segregation
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was often followed by a considerable increase in collab­
8 8
 
oration, particularly among the younger enlisted men,"
 
Moreover, the Chinese not only separated the POWs by rank,
 
but also by race and nationality.
 
The prisoners were separated by race and nation
 
ality in an attempt to exploit minorities. The basis for
 
this type of separation can be traced in the history of
 
prisoner of war camps as a successful tactic. In our Civil
 
War, both the North and South concentrated on men from
 
border states as possible turncoats; in World War I, the
 
Germans targeted the Irishmen among the British forces; in
 
World War II, the United States worked on the Austrian
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prisoners; in Korea, it was the Negro, Puerto Rican,
 
and other Spanish speaking Americans whom the Chinese
 
targeted. The Chinese felt that due to racial problems and
 
discrimination in the U.S., these minorities could be
 
easily exploited and indoctrinated. It was for this reason
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The Negro, although specially targeted for brain
 
washing, performed admirably. This has been attributed to
 
not only the strong moral character of the Negro, but to
 
stupid mistakes made by the Chinese. For example, the
 
Chinese segregated them right after the U.S. Army desegre
 
gated them. Furthermore, when the Chinese talked about how
 
badly they (the Negroes) were treated in America, the
 
Negro would see a correlation between this and the way the
 
Chinese treated the North Koreans; see Mayer, "Why Did Many
 
GI Captives Cave In?," p. 60.
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that a lot of time and pressure was spent on the American
 
POW minorities in the Chinese held camps.
 
Thus far, it has been shown that the breakdown of
 
the prisoner group was initially aided by the withholding
 
of physical necessities, isolation of leaders, and segre
 
gation of the men by race, rank, and nationality. The
 
Chinese enhanced this breakdown through the use of spies,
 
informers, rewards, and manipulation of the mail. Their
 
purpose was to put a halt to all friendships, emotional
 
bonds, and group activities that were not beneficial to
 
<51
them.^
 
Spies and informers were very important in the
 
breakdown of the group according to Schein: "The men
 
reported that the Chinese were forever sneaking around
 
their quarters and listening to conversations or observing
 
activities from hidden posts, and they also knew that some
 
of their number were acting as informers." These informers
 
gave the Communists information about everything that took
 
place in the camp, such as what groups were forming, who
 
was planning an escape, who the troublemakers were, etc.Q2
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Anyone disoovered or caught participating in any of the
 
above activities, or violating any of the camp rules was
 
subject to disciplinary action.
 
The punishment employed by the Chinese was usually
 
psychological in nature, although the fear of physical
 
abuse and/or mistreatment was always of great concern to
 
the prisoners. This was due to the fact that no matter
 
how trivial or insignificant the "crime," the wrongdoings
 
were made to look monumental, resulting in the POW's
 
writing a self-criticism statement. The purpose of these
 
statements were not only to produce guilt and anxiety in
 
the prisoner, but also to be used as an initial step in
 
94

collaboration. The procedure used was as follows:
 
1. 	A crime took place (it could be as
 
insignificant as not bowing in the
 
presence of a Chinese guard).
 
2. 	The prisoner was brought in front of
 
the camp commander.
 
3. 	The camp commander informed the
 
prisoner of the seriousness of the
 
crime, and stressed that if the policy
 
of the Chinese was not so lenient, he
 
he would be severely punished.
 
93The mere threat of death or non-repatriation was
 
especially frightening. The prisoners understood that they
 
could be listed as having died of a jungle disease or heart
 
problem, and no one would know the real cause.
 
94Mayer, "Why Did Many GI Capitves Cave In?,"
 
p. 72.
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4. 	The commander would then ask the POW
 
for his apologies, and ask that he
 
not behave in such a "criminal" manner
 
again.
 
5. 	If the prisoner was indeed sorry, he
 
was asked to write a self-^criticism
 
statement, which did not seem to be
 
too much to ask considering the
 
punishment he could receive.
 
6. 	Lastly, he would then have to present
 
his oral statement to a group of
 
prisoners, who would discuss the
 
seriousness of the crime and the
 
ramifications if such a crime were
 
allowed to continue taking place in
 
the camp. This discussion would be
 
monitored by either the Chinese or a
 
POW working for the enemy.
 
Such public self-criticism was degrading and humil
 
iating to the prisoner and only added to his confusion
 
since he did not know, who his friends really were. As
 
fellow prisoners took part in the discussion, they were
 
often so convincing in their arguments that he would not be
 
sure who actually believed what he did was a crime. In
 
addition, since it was impossible not to violate a rule or
 
anger a guard, one would soon be on report again. This
 
time the camp commander would show more anger because of
 
the prisoner's second violation. The POW would again be
 
willing to write a statement to alleviate the commander's
 
95Schein, "The Chinese Indoctrination Program For
 
Prisoners Of War," p. 159.
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anger, even if it was of more use to the Chinese than the
 
previous one. In time, he would again be back in the
 
commander's office, writing still another but more signifi
 
cant statement. In this way the prisoner had progressed
 
from writing a small, useless statement (i.e., he should
 
follow the rules more closely) to v/riting one of greater
 
significance (i.e., he was involved in the killing of
 
innocent civilians).96 William Mayer has concluded that.
 
The self-criticism amounted to a virtual
 
confession..,a great many soldiers participated
 
in it without realizing that this was what was
 
happening. Moreover, confessions were eventually
 
required to implicate others. Once a man
 
confessed about himself, the Communists would
 
urge him: 'Now let's go a step further. Why
 
don't you talk about your fellow prisoners'
 
problems as well as your own?' It is very simple
 
to see what happened next. These documents
 
became not only confessions, but accusations-

depositions of an informer.97
 
It is now understandable why many repatriated POWs made the
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comment, "You could not rely on anyone."
 
The Chinese's use of rewards was also effective in
 
undermining the group. It was common knowledge throughout
 
the camp that if one cooperated, the Chinese would reward
 
you with fruit, cigarettes, a blanket, etc. Whenever an
 
96
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informer or spy would report a troublemaker or a group
 
leader, instead of physically removing him (which would
 
leave the group intact), they would simply make him look
 
like he was working for them. For example, a prisoner
 
thought to be a group leader would be removed from his
 
company for a day or two. He would then be asked to make a
 
broadcast or sign a self-criticism statement once away from
 
his peers. This was merely a front, because while he was
 
gone, the Chinese would inform his peers that he was
 
working for them. Upon his return to camp, he would be
 
given tangible rewards for all to see. This action would
 
arouse suspicion and hostility in others, and break down
 
any ties there may have been. As a result, it was not
 
uncommon for this individual to begin to collaborate in
 
order to gain more privileges. He would rationalize his
 
actions by believing that he was doing no harm or that he
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was doing it as a service by gathering intelligence.
 
He eventually was cut off from all ties with his friends
 
since no one would trust him, not even other collaborators.
 
He became isolated from other Americans in the camp, and
 
only had the mail from home to keep him in touch with his
 
former society.
 
99Schein, "The Chinese Indoctrination Program For
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The mail, however, offered no salvation for the
 
POW, since his captors were in control of that also. They
 
did not attempt to censor the mail in the usual way (by
 
deleting certain phrases or words). Instead, they withheld
 
the letteh.^^^ Kinkead has stated that whether the
 
mail was outgoing or incoming, "The liklihood of a letter's
 
reaching its destination increased proportionally with
 
the amount of material it contained favorable to the
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Communists." Thus, outgoing letters filled with the
 
appropriate propaganda or incoming letters containing bad
 
news had a very good chance of reaching its destination.
 
Another tactic used by the Chinese was to blame the
 
United States for the lack of mail that the HOW received.
 
The number of excuses mentioned were so legitlipate sounding
 
that they were believed by some of the FOWs. Examples of
 
such reasons included: "Americans are too busy to write to
 
you;" "The U.S. Army has not forwarded :any mail;" or "U.S.
 
bombing raids destroyed the mail awaiting distribution in
 
North Korea." Consequently, a "friendly" Communist (an
 
interrogator or guard) would often offer to look into the
 
matter in order to help his "comrade." Oftentimes, within
 
a few days, he would give several letters to the prisoner.
 
^Kinkead, In Every War But One, p. 121.
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This evoked a sense of gratitude in the POW, and even
 
though he could not trust anyone else in the camp, he could
 
trust his Communist friend.1 OP This procedure was used
 
by the Chinese whenever it suited tlieir purpose.
 
■ ■ I 
In commenting on these tactics, Edward Hunter 
states that, "The Communist interrogators, as the brain-
washers called themselves, sought toj remove a man's trust 
' ■ • ' ' i 
in his own side, and to convince him that he was being let
 
down and even betrayed by his own coiantry and relatives...
 
The Reds sought to deprive him of all hope."^^^ Edgar
 
Schein further adds that the outcomeiof the above treatment
 
1
 
was that It "helped to create a feel|Lng of general distrust
 
...the only fully safe course was to'withdraw from all
 
! I o Ji
 
Intimate interaction with other prisoners."
 
While the Chinese were in the process of breaking
 
down the group solidarity, the FOWs went about their normal
 
daily routine. It consisted of streriuous work details,
 
such as gathering wood, carrying wate;r, repairing roads.
 
^°^Ibid, pp. 121-122.
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and the general maintenance of the camp. Another part
 
of the daily routine consisted of attending indoctrination
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classes for five hours. There were two main reasons the
 
prisoners were required to participate in the classes.
 
First, as stated by Mayer, the Chinese "obviously believed
 
that the average American soldier was poorly informed to an
 
extreme degree about his own country, his own economic and
 
political systems; was even more poorly informed about the
 
politics, economics, and social problems of other
 
countries;.,.and was a man who, if deprived of material
 
sources of support, would prove to be insecure, easily
 
manipulated and controlled, lacking in real loyalties and
 
107

convictions." Second, aS, the U.N. entrance into the
 
Korean War was considered a criminal act by the Chinese,
 
the POWs were to be treated as "students," so that they
 
could learn the truth about the facts of Communism and U.S. 
. ■ 108 
aggression.
 
As a student, the prisoner had to listen to
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""^Ibid, p. 152.
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Kinkead, In Every War But One, p. IO3.
 
107Mayer, "Why Did Many GI Captives Cavein?,"
 
p. 58.
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Schein, '^Reaction Patterns To Severe, Chronic
 
Stress In American Army Prisoners Of The Chinese," p. 22.
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lectures and radio broadcasts, and read material slanted
 
toward the Communist point of view.^^^ They stressed the
 
social, political, and economic problems in the United
 
States and compared them to a more promising way of
 
life—Communism. At the conclusion of each lecture, the
 
prisoners were given questions to discuss and answer.
 
These discussions would be monitored by both Chinese and
 
POW monitors. After a predetermined amount of time, each
 
individual would be required to submit his answers to the
 
lecturer. If the answers were unacceptable, the process
 
would start over again, until the individual's answer were
 
110

accepted. The effect of this process was as follows:
 
There is an endless repetition of formulas,
 
explanations, and simple stimuli. Of course, in
 
the beginning all this merely evokes the
 
subject's scorn and disbelief. After some time,
 
however, erosion takes place; whether the subject
 
likes it or not, he ends up knowing by heart
 
certain formulas of the catechism repeated to him
 
a thousand times; he ends up inhabited by these
 
slogans, which still carry no conviction...But it
 
must not be forgotten that the prisoner hears
 
nothing else, and that the incessant repetition
 
of these slogans also prevents any personal
 
109

This reading material included not only
 
Communist Party publications, but writings by Tolstoy,
 
Charles Dickens, Upton Sinclair, and John Steinbeck to name
 
a few. These writers highlight aspects of Capitalism which
 
were unacceptable to the Communists; see Kinkead, In Every
 
War But One, p. 103.
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Schein, "The Chinese Indoctrination Program For
 
Prisoners Of War," pp. 155, 157.
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reflection or meditation...The result is an
 
involuntary penetration and a certain
 
intellectual weakening, added to the
 
impossibility of leading a private intellectual
 
life.Ill
 
The outcome was that given the one-sidedness of the
 
argument, "Half-truths and even entire lies sounded
 
convincing...The inquisitors gave our men nothing to think
 
of except Communism."112 Furthermore, if the lectures
 
did not enlighten the prisoner as far as the lecturer was
 
liq
 
concerned, he could be put into solitary confinement.
 
This would allow him to reflect on the Communist viewpoint,
 
while at the same time, question his own beliefs as well.
 
In the Spring of 1950, the first "peace committees"
 
were organized as instruments of propaganda and to further
 
, . 114
 
aid the brainwashing process. POWs were recruited for
 
these committees either on the basis of their prior work
 
for the Communists, or for the purpose of discrediting a
 
particular prisoner. Those recruited were chosen by the
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Ellul, Propaganda; The Formation Of Men's
 
Attitudes, p. 312.
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U.S. Congress, House, Communist Psychological
 
Warfare (Brainwashing). pp. 16-17.
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This was not the only reason a prisoner was put
 
in solitary confinement; other reasons included punishment
 
for resistance, disrespect to guards, etc.
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Dixon, "Duress And Coercion: A Defense Of
 
Collaborating," p. 239.
 
^8
 
"democratic" method. An election would be held, but
 
everyone knew that the one favored by the Communists would
 
win. If he did not, the election was held again and again
 
until he was elected.115 In this manner, the Chinese
 
had the men they wanted serving on the committees.
 
The loyalties of the other prisoners was a critical
 
factor that had to be contended with if chosen to be a mem-^
 
ber of (or in dealing with) the peace committee, since no
 
one knew who was working for the Chinese or who was merely
 
pretending to do so. "If a man was pretending, he had to
 
11^
 
hide this carefully lest a real pro turn him in to the
 
Chinese. Yet a man who sincerely believed in the Chinese
 
peace effort had to hide this fact from others who might be
 
pretenders, for fear that they might harm him directly or
 
blacklist him for the future, at the same time convincing
 
other pro's that he really was sincerei"117 This "Catch
 
115Schein, "The Chinese Indoctrination Program For
 
Prisoners Of War," p. 154.
 
116Pro's, also known as progressives and partici
 
pators, were those prisoners who aided the enemy whenever
 
possible in order to gain rewards, special treatment, etc;
 
see Julius Segal, "Correlates Of Collaboration And
 
Resistance Behavior Among U.S. Anmy POWs In Korea," The
 
Journal Of Social Issues 3 (1957); p. 32.
 
■ ■ ■ ■ 117Schein, "The Chinese Indoctrination Program For
 
Prisoners Of War," p. 155.
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22," in which the prisoner was in trouble with his
 
fellow prisoners if he was known to be a pro, and on the
 
other hand, was in trouble with the Chinese if he was found
 
to be pretending, is further evidence of the overall group
 
breakdown that occured and the problem it caused. A POW in
 
fact had to be a good actor, and not say the wrong thing at
 
the wrong time in order to stay out of trouble with the
 
Chinese or his fellow prisoners.
 
In June of 1951, it was suggested by the Soviet
 
Ambassador to the United Nations that talks should begin in
 
119
 
order to put an end to the hostilities in Korea. Two
 
months later, negotiations began. Admiral C. Turner Joy,
 
then Senior Delegate and Chief of the United Nations
 
Command Delegation to the Korean Armistice Conference,
 
brought up the matter of exchanging names of their respec
 
tive prisoners of war to the North Korean delegates. A
 
sub-committee was formed, and by the end of the year, lists
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were exchanged. It has been suggested by Leslie Dixon
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A "Catch 22" can be seen as an avoidance-

avoidance conflict, most accurately described as, "You're
 
damned if you do and damned if you don't;" see Joseph
 
Heller, Catch 22 (New York: Dell Publishing Co., Inc.,
 
1955), p. 47.
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C. Turner Joy (Adm, USN Ret), How Communists
 
Negotiate (New York: The MacMillan Company^ 1965), pi T.
 
""^^Ibid, pp. 148-150.
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that the exchange accounted for the fact that conditions
 
began to improve for the POWs. With these improved condi
 
tions came fewer deaths and fewer charges of collaboration
 
for the time period that followed, since the brainwashing
 
121
 
program also came to an end.
 
The information presented in Chapter Three has
 
shown that the breakdown of formal and informal groups and
 
restricting normal relationships was an important variable
 
in explaining the behavior of American POWs. Although this
 
breakdown was found to be a "key factor" in the brain
 
washing process, there were other factors that aided in
 
this breakdown. It is necessary therefore to explore some
 
of these factors, especially the various theoretical
 
interpretations, to further clarify what took place in the
 
Chinese held POW camps.
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Dixon, "Duress And Coercion: A Defense Of
 
Collaborating," p. 239.
 
IV. SOME THEORETICAL EXPLANATIONS OF BRAINWASHING
 
The Psyoho-physiologioal Explanation
 
In the article, "Communist Interrogation and
 
Indoctrination of 'Enemies Of The State',"12? Lawrence E.
 
Hinkle Jr., and Harold G. Wolff recognize that in Korea,
 
the Communists were successful in "demoralizing" American
 
soldiers. They believe that initially the demoralizing
 
process was accidental, resulting from supply and communi
 
cation problems, inadequate facilities, and the insensi­
tivity of the peasant soldier. Later however, the use of
 
informers and the segregation of leaders greatly aided the
 
Chinese in achieving their goal.
 
In using the psycho-physiological model to explain
 
what happened in Korea, Hinkle and Wolff utilize the
 
concept of homeostasis, in which an individual's environ
 
ment is in a state of equalibrium. This equalibrium is not
 
only dependent on satisfying one's physical needs, such as
 
having a comfortable body tempsrature, adequate food, air,
 
and water intake, but also on one's psychological needs as
 
well. This also includes satisfactory interaction with
 
122L. E. Hinkle and H. G. Wolff, Communist
 
Interrogation and Indoctrination Of 'Enemies Of The
 
State'," AHA Archives Of Neurology And Psychiatry, 76
 
(1956): p. 168. ^ ^ ~~
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others who are close in proximity. Problems seem to arise
 
when one's equalibrium is upset, and man, taking the
 
natural course expected of him, attempts to restore this
 
12^
 
balance.
 
Some of the psycho-physiological techniques used by
 
the Chinese in Korea were: standing at attention for long
 
periods of time; being slapped Or kicked; being kept in
 
solitary confinement; being made to stand on toes with rope
 
124

around neck; and being made to stand in water. In
 
experiments where individuals are placed in a situation
 
which produces disequalibrium, the individual does every
 
thing he can to relieve the stress he is going through.
 
This includes random exploration, in which one becomes
 
"excited, anxious, hyperactive, and panicy." If the stress
 
is not satisfactorily relieved, he goes into an inactive,
 
dejected state. In this state he becomes dependent upon
 
anyone who offers to help him. In the FOW camp, it was one
 
of the Chinese Communists (usually an interrogator or
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L. E. Hinkle and H. G. Wolff, "Communist
 
Interrogation And Indoctrination Of 'Enemies Of The
 
State'," pp. 168-169.
 
124Kinkead, In Every War But One, p. 112; Schein,
 
"The Chinese Indoctrination Program For Prisoners Of War,"
 
p. 162; The Army did not consider the above acts torture,
 
and equated them to the same type of stress a combat
 
soldier undergoes; see Kinkead, In Every War But One,
 
p. 112.' ^
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guard) who came to the prisoner's aid. This gave the
 
prisoner the opportunity to talk, for he was in great need
 
of social interaction due to the breakdown of the group,
 
distrust of the other POWs, and from the ordeal he had just
 
gone through. The prisoner was allowed to talk about
 
anything he wished, because this afforded the Communist the
 
opportunity to establish a good relationship with the
 
captive. "Because of his dependence upon the interrogator,
 
the prisoner develops an intense desire to please him. The
 
prisoner glows when he is rewarded, and is deeply disturbed
 
125
 
when he is rejected."
 
An example of this process has been cited on pages
 
43-44 of this thesis. It showed that a POW looking for
 
social ties was aided by Chinese Communists who gave him
 
mail from home. This would evoke a sense of trust in the
 
POW and it enabled them to exploit the prisoner under the
 
guise of friendship.126
 
Another excellent example has been described by
 
Captain Zach W. Dean after his repatriation from the
 
Chinese. After being taken on what was described as a
 
"death march". Dean was not only harassed by the Chinese
 
125 .
 
Hinkle and Wolff, "Communist Interrogation And
 
Indoctrination Of 'Enemies Of The State'," pp. 170-171.
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Kinkead, In Every War But One, p. 122.
 
■ '54 
but he was also deprived of food and warmth. When he felt
 
he Gould not hold oh any longer, the Communists went to
 
great lengths to revive him. He was treated kindly, and
 
given food and adequate living accommodations. After a few
 
weeks, he was again deprived of physical needs, harassed
 
and lectured on Communism, and left to die. Again he was
 
revived and nursed back to health. The effects of this
 
treatment are best expressed by Dean: "I don't believe
 
you'll be able to understand what I'm going to tell you
 
now. After the Reds do that to you a few times, you are
 
grateful to them for saving your life. You forget that
 
127
 
they are the people who almost killed you."
 
The Learning Theory Explanation
 
According to other writers, what took place in the
 
Chinese held.POW camps was the outcome of Ivan Pavlov's
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work with dogs Robert Merloo has suggested that in
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U.S. Cbngress, House, Communist Psychological
 
Warfare (Brainwashing), p. 17.
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Lifton, Thought Reform And The Psychology Of
 
Totalism, p. 3885 Robert Merloo, "Pavlovian Strategy As A
 
Weapon In Mentlcide," American Journal Of Psychiatry 110
 
(1954): p. 809; P. S. Santucci and G. Winokur, "Brain
 
washing As A Factor In Psychiatric Illness," AMA Archives
 
Of Neurology And Psychiatry 74 (1955): pp. 11-16; Sargant,
 
Battle For The Mind, pp. 29-45; Hunter, Brainwashing: From
 
Pavlov To Powers, pp. 17-41; (Hunter has even gone so far
 
as to state that a four hundred page secret manuscript
 
exists in the Kremlin in which results of extensive
 
research by Pavlov on human beings is compiled.)
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order for conditioning to have taken place in the POW
 
camps, two elements had to be present. First, there had to
 
be the breakdown of the group, in which "old patterns have
 
to be broken down in order to build up conditioned
 
reflexes."129 This was done by isolation, whereby
 
"feelings of terror, fear, and hopelessness, of being
 
alone, of standing with one's back to the wall" is the
 
outcome. Secondly, "guilt must be aroused." This was done
 
by interrogations, self-criticism statements, etc../*^*^
 
William Sargant agrees with Merloo and contends that, "Once
 
a state of hysteria has been induced in men or dogs by
 
mounting stresses which the brain can no longer tolerate,
 
protective inhibition is likely to supervene." This is
 
seen to disturt) the individual's previously conditioned
 
behavior patterns, and leaves one increasingly susceptible
 
. 131
 to suggestion. The two types of conditioning mentioned
 
deal with the basic conditioning of reflexes and neurosis.
 
At the core of the classical conditioning process
 
is the learning of reflexes, which are "involuntary
 
responses elicited by a specific stimulus" (i.e., pulling
 
129
 
Merloo, The Rape Of The Mind, pp. 43-45.
 
130
 
Idem, "Pavlovian Strategy As A Weapon In
 
Menticide," p. 8II.
 
^^^Sargant, Battle For The Mind, p. 59.
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one's hand away from a hot stove). In Pavlov's studies, a
 
dog 	was given food immediately after the flashing of a
 
light. The dog's response to the food was the activation
 
of its salivary glands. It was discovered that after
 
several pairings of the food with the light, the light
 
1 Qp

alone would elicit salivation. In order that the
 
reader may better understand this process, the following
 
terms should be clarified:
 
1. 	Unconditioned Stimulus (UCS)—Any
 
stimulus that regularly produces a
 
response.
 
2. 	Unconditioned Response (UCR)--The
 
reaction to the UCS.
 
3. 	Condition Stimulus (CS)—A neutral
 
stimulus that is paired with the UCS
 
which prior to the process does not
 
produce UCR.
 
4. 	Conditioned Response(CR)—-After
 
several pairings with the UCS, the CS
 
begins to elicit the same reactions
 
as the UCS, making the response a
 
conditioned response (CR) or a learned
 
response.^
 
In a classical conditioning framework, a neutral
 
conditioned stimulus (CS) is paired with a non-neutral
 
stimulus (UCS) which produces a response (UCR). After
 
several pairings of the conditioned stimulus (CS) and the
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Gregory Eirable, Norman Garmezy, and Edward
 
Zigler, Principles Of General Psychology, Fourth Edition
 
(New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1975), p. 209.
 
\^^lbid, pp. 209-219.
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unconditioned stimulus (UCS), the conditioned stimulus (CS)
 
has the ability to elicit a response resembling that of the
 
unconditioned response (UCR). The reflex is therefore
 
learned or conditioned, and referred to as the conditioned
 
134
 
response (CR).
 
An example of the type of conditioning which took
 
place in North Korea is diagrammed as follows:
 
UCS Food (or reward of 
some sort) 
-^-UCR Favorable reaction 
to Chinese 
Slogans (propaganda
 
This shows that the food (UCS) is paired with slogans (CS).
 
The UCS emits a favorable reaction to the Chinese (UCR).
 
After several pairings, the slogans alone will elicit a
 
favorable response to the Chinese. This is shown as:
 
CS Slogans ^CR Favorable reaction to Chinese
 
It is seen that the prisoners were conditioned to
 
equate a previous neutral stimulus to favorable reactions
 
to the Chinese by the POWs. Edward Hunter, after watching
 
1 34

^ Ibid, p. 214.
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a film entitled The Nervous System. in whieh Pavlov
 
himself conditions a man to salivate to a flash of light,
 
asked the following question to a psychiatrist with whom he
 
saw the movie:
 
Hunter: 	"What if the person doesn't want
 
to react that way?"
 
Psychiatrist: "He can't help it!
 
Nothing he can do can
 
stop his saliva glands
 
from working."^3d
 
In other 	words, once conditioned, the individual is power
 
less to do anything about it as long as the proper sequence
 
of reinforcement is used and other variables are not
 
introduced.
 
In other studies, Pavlov found that if a dog was
 
presented with food in temperal association with light, the
 
dog would salivate. After conditioning the dog to salivate
 
to this circle of light, it was found that the dog would
 
not salivate if presented with an eclipse of light (and no
 
food). In addition, the closer the eclipse came to repre
 
senting a whole circle, differentiation became harder for
 
the dog. This conflict caused the dog to howl and become
 
excited, which has become known as an experimental
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Edward Hunter claims he has seen two versions
 
of this film--one depicting experimentation on people and
 
one that deletes the experience.
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Hunter, Brainwashing: From Pavlov To Powers,
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neurosis, or confusion neurosis. ^ This explanation
 
has also been used by P. S. Santuoci and G. Winokur to
 
account for how the prisoners were brainwashed in Korea.
 
Santucci and Winokur believe that there are three
 
types of conditioned responses,' and that behavior consists
 
not only of verbal activities, but of thinking and motor
 
activity as well. In the POW camps, the prisoners were
 
forced into doing things that they did not wish to do (i.e.
 
sing Communist songs, and write statements). By partici
 
pating, even though forced to do so, they were rewarded
 
for their behavior. "If, in the beginning, the patient^
 
did not believe in his statements and activities, there
 
would have inevitably been an internal conflict between his
 
motor and speech responses as opposed to thinking.
 
When put in this situation (described as a Catch 22 above),
 
a confusion neurosis was likely to ensue. There are three
 
ways to care for this type of neurosis: try and outwit the
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captors, refuse to do their bidding, or think and act as
 
they wish you to act. Santucci and Winokur feel that the
 
latter of the three was the course of action that the POWs
 
in Korea took since it was the path of least resistance,
 
and, in addition, was where rewards instead of punishments
 
141

prevailed.
 
I. F. Farber, Harry F. Harlow, and Louis J. West
 
present a theoretical analysis of the psychological states
 
that were at work in Korea in their article, "Brainwashing,
 
Conditioning, and DDD (Debility, Dependency, and Dread)."
 
Although they did not go into great detail on the contrib
 
uting factors, they did recognize that "the effectiveness
 
of Communist methods was undoubtedly greatly enhanced by
 
their control of the means for satisfying nuclear social
 
needs for recognition, status, communication, and so on."
 
Therefore, what took place in the camps was possible due to
 
these social controls, which the author of this thesis
 
perceives as the breakdown of the group.1 k?
 
Farber et al feel that the psychological states at
 
work in Korea consisted of debility, in which individuals
 
exposed to noxious stimulation, injury, malnutrition.
 
1 ill
 
'^'ibid, pp. 15-16.
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I. F. Farber, Harry F. Harlow, and Louis J.
 
West, "Brainwashing, Conditioning, And DDD (Debility,
 
Dependency, And Dread)," Sociometry 20 (1957), p. 273.
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deprivation, etc., were left in a weakened psyohological
 
state; dependency, in which they were dependent on the
 
Chinese for basic need satisfaction; and dread, which
 
14-5
 
consists of great fear and anxiety. The manipulation
 
and use of these three factors had a two-fold effect.
 
First, it put the prisoner in a state in which he had
 
little response for what was going on around him. This
 
tended to disrupt his sense of time and self-concept.
 
Second, his symbolic processes were affected, which has
 
been suggested could have made him susceptible to condi
 
tioning. aThis conditioning process, according to Farber ^ 
 
al. relies mainly on operant (instrumental) conditioning,
 
1421
 
although classical conditioning was also used.
 
The first thing the Communists did was to condition
 
the prisoner to believe that DDD could be alleviated.
 
(This was referred to as classically conditioning anticipa
 
tory goal response by Farber et al.) Such expectancy of
 
relief served the purpose of keeping the prisoner's hopes
 
alive, whereas if he were totally broken down he would be
 
of no use to the Communists. An example Of this can be
 
Seen in the case of the soldier who was instructed by the
 
Chinese to stand at attention for long hours or confined
 
^^^Ibid, ppv/ 272-273;
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Ibid, pp.: 274-276.
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to the "hole" for failure to cooperate. The prisoner
 
was made aware that the reason for his predicament was
 
"self-inflicted." If he wished his hardships to cease, all
 
he had to do was inform his captors of his willingness to
 
cooperate. This served to increase the intensity of his
 
thoughts of relief, since he knew he had the ability to
 
146

alleviate his hardships. Upon cooperating, operant
 
conditioning was a by-product (that is, what takes place
 
after a response determines whether that response will
 
147
 
persist—with emphasis on reinforcement ). In the above
 
example, relief i'rom standing at attention or release from
 
the hole is a reinforcer. Additionally, "interrogation,
 
148
threats, and contumely may also have a rewarding aspect,
 
so great is the acquired reinforcement value of social
 
communication and speech under conditions of isolation.
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The hole;was usually a small, tin box in which
 
the prisoner was deprived of food and water, and where
 
temperatures reached dangerous extremes.
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contumely—"insulting display of contempt in
 
words or actions; contemptuous or humiliating treatment;
 
see The Random House Dictionary Of The English Language,
 
s.v. "contumely."
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dependency, and debility." DDD is thus seen to
 
encompass the ideas of Hinkle and Wolff, Pavlov, and
 
Skinner's operant conditioning as well.
 
The Socio-psychological Explanation
 
In response to this psycho-physiological explana
 
tion, Edgar Schein has stated that the physical hardships
 
and deprivations used in Korea were either attempts to
 
degrade and humiliate the prisoner or the result of
 
extenuating circumstances (Chinese inability to keep the
 
prisons supplied, anger of the guards, inspire fear in
 
1 jT n
 
others, etc.). Schein sees a socio-psychological
 
explanation for the methods used in North Korea. In his
 
article, "Interpersonal Communication, Group Solidarity,
 
and Social Influence," he uses many of the Sociologist
 
Erving Goffman's ideas in order to present a theory of
 
influence dealing with attitude and value change. Schein
 
believes that groups and individuals are protected against
 
change or influence through an interpersonal communication
 
process. This process includes social relationships,
 
roles, and self-images which are important to groups and
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individual functioning. He further believes that, "In*'
 
order for people to accomplish any kind of task together
 
they must have a certain level of regard for each other,
 
which is usually reflected in the.degree of attention they
 
give to each other...If such regard or involvement is
 
improperly low or high, it is a signal that the person can
 
not be trusted not-to take advantage of the other partici­
151
 
pants in the situation." With the breakdown of the
 
group in Korea, the regard and invo-lvement which POW's had
 
for each other was consequently very low. The result was
 
that their opinions:.and beliefs, self-images, and fundamen
 
tal values became susceptabre to change. Schein gives two
 
reasons for this. First, with the breaking of old ties
 
within the group,.the POW was looking to regain those ties
 
or establish new ones. Schein believes this could not
 
occur without "some personal change." Secondly, having no
 
one with whom to compare beliefs and judgements, he became
 
susceptable to "cognitive re-definition." By this Schein
 
means that "process of accepting new definitions for
 
existing concepts, placing concepts into new scales of
 
evaluation, or shifting the anchors or neutral points on
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Edgar Schein, "Interpersonal Communication,
 
Group SoITdarity, and Socialvlnfluehce," Sociometry 23
 
(I960): p. 149.
 
 such scalesJ??.Such re-definition might take the form of
 
not recognizing that his behavior was in fact helping the
 
enemy, or of re-evaluating relative priorities where
 
153

conflicting values were involved."
 
An example of this can be seen to have occurred
 
before the breakdown of the group had begun> If one
 
recalls the fears that the soldier initially experienced
 
upon capture, it was shown that not long after falling into
 
the enemyls hands, a change in the individual's beliefs
 
took place. Since he was not tortured or killed outright,
 
his prior attitudes and beliefs about the Chinese were
 
suddenly being questioned, and an Inevitable change
 
154
 
occurred in those beliefs.
 
Another example previously cited was about the
 
prisoner who was in distress because he had not received
 
any mail. After talking with a sympathetic Communist
 
guard, the outcome was that the guard would bring him some
 
mail within a few days. Consequently, a re-defining of the
 
prisoners beliefs took place, because the Communist guards
 
■ ■ 152
^ Ibid, p. 151.
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Prisoners Of War," pp. 150-151; Kinkead, In Every War But
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would be looked upon much more favorably.^
 
Further examples of cognitive re-definition as it
 
took place in the prisoner of war camps were as follows: a
 
confined officer would write a propaganda statement rather
 
than risk having all of his men shot; prisoners giving
 
information during an interrogation because they knew that
 
a fellow POW had already given the same information;
 
prisoners collaborating with the Communists in order that
 
a friend would be given medicine or that their families
 
' 1 "S6

would be notified that they were alive but prisoners.
 
The above examples support Schein's theory that
 
with the breakdown of the group (and in certain cases
 
before the brainwashing process began in the permanent
 
camps), the cognitive processes and existing beliefs are
 
thrown into a state of disequalibrium or dissonance. Due
 
to this disruption of social ties, the individual's
 
beliefs, self-image, and social roles become subject to
 
change, because "forces against change are reduced or
 
removed" (group cohesion broken down); "motives toward
 
re-integration are induced" (ripe for influence); and
 
"cognitive re-definitions are facilitated" (change in
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beliefs, values, etc.).157
 
The Sociological Explanation
 
In the theories cited above, it was shown that the
 
methods employed by the Chinese were largely responsible
 
for the POW's brainwashing in Korea. Furthermore, emphasis
 
was always placed on the breakdown in group cohesion as a
 
key factor in each of the theories presented. Both William
 
E. Mayer, in an article in U.S. News & World Report, and
 
Eugene Kinkead, in his book. In Every War But One, submit
 
that the breakdown of the group was an important aspect in
 
the brainwashing process. The methods used could not have
 
been successful they believe, if it was not for certain
 
1 JT Q
 
defects in American society. These were seen in
 
three main areas: character development and discipline;
 
education; and military preparedness.
 
Regarding character development and discipline,
 
Mayer felt that many of the prisoners he interviewed and
 
studied159 "had not been taught a sense of personal
 
^^"^Ibid, p. 158.
 
158Kinkead, In Every War But One, pp. 154-157;
 
Mayer, "Why Did Many GI Captives Cave In?,"pp. 60-64.
 
159Major Mayer was (in 1956) a U.S. Army expert
 
on brainwashing. He bases his theory on interviews with
 
two hundred repatriated POWs and by studing approximately
 
eight hundred of the returnees records; see Mayer, "Why Did
 
Many GI Captives Cave In?," p. 56.
 
68 
responsibility for the welfare of others," He emphasized
 
that the Significant Others who were responsible for
 
1^n
 instilling this in children failed in their duty.
 
Additionally, it was suggested by Major Clarence L.
 
Anderson, an Army doctor and prisoner in Korea, that the
 
POW's problems were the result not only of inadequate
 
socialization of the POWs, but of a "new softness" that
 
161
this lack of socialization induced. This softness has
 
been attributed to "momism", with such dependence resulting
 
^ f\0
 in passivity and imaturity in the young soldiers. This
 
type of socialization was also reflected in the type of
 
education that the individual received.
 
In his discussion on education, Mayer not only
 
referred to the lack of basic education, but to an
 
educational system which did not stress the benefits and/or
 
difficulties of living in a democracy. He also stated that
 
education should be directed toward each citize^n so that
 
each person becomes an active, responsible member of our
 
democratic society. This advocated the revival of
 
patriotism, which was being looked upon at the time as
 
160
Mayer, "Why Did Many GI Captives Cave In?,"
 
p. 60.
 
I- .
 
Kinkead, In Every War But One, p. 156.
 
162

Mayer, "Why Did Many GI Captives Cave In?,"
 
p. 60-61.
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16^
 being foolish. With this type of breakdown in the
 
socialization process of our society, it is reasonable to
 
conclude problems would occur in the ranks of the U.S.
 
military, since the services drew its members from society.
 
In addition to the "inadequate socialization and
 
education" our young men received, the problems were
 
compounded by the results of the Dpolittle Board of 1945.
 
The purpose of the Doolittle Board was to deal with the
 
perceived inequities between the officer and enlisted
 
ranks. As World War II had recently come to close, the
 
decisions of that board were reached for two reasons.
 
First, the Army was planning its future around peace, and
 
second, the abuses of enlisted men by officers (which were
 
later the subject of many popular movies and books, i.e.
 
From Here To Eternity, The Caine Mutiny, etc.).
 
Therefore, in response to the social climate of the time,
 
two of the actions recommended by this board greatly
 
affected the Army and its discipline:
 
1. 	The power of the Company Grade Officer
 
was perceived as being diminished,
 
particularly in the area of summary
 
court martial.
 
2. 	The Inspector General (IG) system was
 
emphasized as a viable "complaint
 
department" for any soldier who felt
 
^^^Ibid, pp.: 61-62.
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164
 
he was wronged.
 
The effects of these two measures were seen by-

some as an extension of the problems in our society, by
 
fostering the breakdown of discipline. They argued that
 
many officers felt stripped of their power, refused to be
 
responsible for the actions of their men, and would not
 
give unpopular orders. The Noncommissioned officer, who
 
previously had been looked upon as a demi-god, saw that the
 
officers as well as themselves were without their past
 
status and authority. Moreover, with the threat that
 
anyone could go over their heads to the Inspector General,
 
they were reluctant to enforce disciplinary measures which
 
might precipitate an investigation. As a consequence, many
 
believe this policy was responsible for the "complete
 
165

gutting of discipline."
 
The effects of this "gutting of discipline" on
 
military preparedness was also explored. It was suggested
 
that too much time was spent on the mechanical aspects of
 
164
 
The summary court martial is, "The lowest
 
of three types of courts-martial. It consists of one
 
commissioned officer who acts as judge, jury, trial
 
counsel, and defense counsel (unless the accused is repre
 
sented by a separate counsel)"; see Edward M. Byrne,
 
Military Law (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1981),
 
756; Kinkead, In Every War But One, pp. 175-176.
 
^^^Kinkead, In Every War But One, pp. 174-178.
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war rather than on human ones. The Army was referred to
 
as a "riding Army" which, when vehicles broke down, the
 
soldier, accustomed to riding, was ineffective on foot.
 
With the emphasis on mechanized armies in modern warfare,
 
16T
 
discipline suffered the same breakdown as the vehicles.
 
Thus, according to Mayer and Kinkead, the Army was supplied
 
and influenced by a society which did not properly
 
socialize its members. The Army fielded in Korea was not
 
only weak in moral Character, education, and preparedness,
 
but it was also lacking in the discipline needed in battle.
 
When taken prisoner, the soldiers were ill-prepared for the
 
ordeals they encountered.
 
In contrast, perhaps one might use the following
 
summary of the Turkish soldier's resistance to brainwashing
 
in Korea. Of the roughly 6,000 United Nations soldiers
 
captured by Communist forces, 229 of them were Turkish. At
 
the cessation of hostilities, all 229 Turkish prisoners
 
168
 
were repatriated during Operation Big Switch. Eugene
 
Kinkead and William Mayer indicate that the Turks were
 
subjected to the same brainwashing process and living
 
166
 
Mayer, "Why Did Many GI Captives Cave In?,"
 
p. 60.
 
167
 
Kinkead, In Every War But One, p. 173.
 
^^^Ibid,: pp. 164-165
 
72 
oonditions as the other U.N. prisoners, yet they held up
 
very well---all 229 captured were repatriated, all resisted
 
indoctrination, and only two collaborated (and were
 
ostraci2ed)--even though specifically targeted for indoc
 
trination. Their success stemmed from their adherence to
 
military organization and discipline, which resisted all
 
169
 
attempts to break down the group. A Turkish officer
 
stated: "I told the Chinese Commander of the camp that
 
while we were a unit, I was in charge of my group...If he
 
wanted anything done, he was to come to see me, and I would
 
see that it was done. When he removed me, the responsi
 
bility would fall not on him, but on the man next below me,
 
and after that on the man below him. And so on, down
 
through the ranks, until there were only two privates
 
left."170 Moreover, it was found that if a man was too
 
sick or wounded to care for himself, men were assigned to
 
nurse him back to health; oftentimes this required bathing
 
171

and spoon-feeding the patient. According to Kinkead:
 
the Turks pretty well flouted the authority of
 
their Chinese captors. They broke rules and
 
169
 
Mayer, "Why Did Many GI Captives Cave In?,"
 
p. 58; Kinkead, In Every War But One, pp. 165-168.
 
170

Kinkead, In Every War But One, p. 166.
 
171

Mayer, "Why Did Many GI Captives Cave In?,"
 
p. 58.
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often refused to obey ostensibly reasonable
 
requests. They simply declined to cooperate, and
 
eventually the Communists left them alone. It
 
was generally believed that the Chinese feared
 
the Turks to some degree because they stuck
 
together as a group and resisted as a group.
 
Their discipline and military organization saw
 
them through as prisoners with no fatalities and
 
virtually no indoctrination.''72
 
The successful resistance to the breakdown of the
 
group was therefore seen as the reason that the Turks
 
fared so well in the POW camps. This would, in Mayer and
 
Kinkead's viewpoint, be attributed to the solidity of their
 
socialization process and in their society in general.
 
There are other cases of similar actions by U.S. service­
men, 
173 however, the Turkish viewpoint was presented due
 
to the number involved and their continued effectiveness at
 
thwarting the Chinese's attempts to brainwash them.
 
The Eclectic Explanation
 
Albert Somit has submitted an eclectic explanation
 
for the processes at work in brainwashing. He stated that,
 
"There is now also general agreement that the techniques
 
was not the outgrowth of a consistent or even conscious
 
adherence to any single school." He believed that there
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Kinkead, In Every War But One, p. 168.
 
173Biderman, March To Calumny, pp. 58-61;
 
Kinkead, In Every War But On'^ p"^ 169
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are 	ten mechanisms in the brainwashing process. They are
 
as follows:
 
1. Identification--Due to isolation, the
 
prisoner will try to find someone to
 
identify with in order to establish
 
social ties. The likely candidate is
 
an interrogator, in which emotional
 
involvement becomes an important
 
aspect in the prisoners capitulation.
 
2. 	Decrease Of Intellectual Capacity—Due
 
to physical and mental exhaustion,
 
the prisoner is unable to think
 
effectively.
 
3. 	Disorientation Arising From Solitary
 
Confinement—When confined alone for a
 
long period of time, the prisoner is
 
in need of interaction. This can
 
lead to a "stimulus hunger," in which
 
the prisoner becomes susceptible to
 
suggestion.
 
4. 	Suggestion—With great stresses put
 
on the prisoner, the individual's
 
mental conditions are weakened. He
 
is then subject to suggestion.
 
5. 	Repetition—-With constant repetition,
 
any message is likely to get through
 
defenses, especially those that are
 
credible.
 
6. 	Guilt Feeling—These are aroused by
 
having the prisoner reflect on past
 
bad deeds. Once these are brought to
 
light, these deeds are use(^ against
 
the individual to undermine resistance.
 
7. 	Ego Destruction—The humiliation and
 
degradation the prisoner goes through
 
results in the loss of self-esteem.
 
This affects the prisoners ability to
 
resist.
 
8. 	Conditioned Behavior—Somit sees this
 
as a matter of controversy, but
 
concedes that, "there is no question.
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however, that the deliberate relating
 
of punishment and reward to progress
 
or the lack of progress is one way of
 
'conditioning' the prisoner to make the
 
type 	of response desired."
 
9. 	Nonrational Behavior In The Face Of
 
Sudden Stimulus—Prisoners who are
 
suddenly subjected to an unexpected,
 
overwhelming stimulus are not seen to
 
be able to resist for long.
 
10. 	Alternation Of Fear And Hope—
 
Although the prisoners are treated
 
poorly, the captors insinuate that
 
there is a better life ahead for those
 
that cooperate. This keeps the
 
prisoners from completely giving up,
 
leaving them open for exploitation.^
 
Although Somit makes a weak case for the breakdown
 
of the group, it should be noted that his explanation
 
refers mainly to the brainwashing of individuals, which
 
differs slightly from that of groups. The difference is
 
that, with individuals, the prisoner is isolated from the
 
start due to the fact that he is alone in his ordeal. In a
 
group setting, however, the group must be broken down prior
 
to the isolation. It is this writer's opinion that had
 
Somit expanded his summary to include the brainwashing of
 
groups, he would have highlighted this point.
 
In summary, it should be emphasized that the
 
purpose of presenting the above theories was not to imply
 
that one was more applicable than another in explaining
 
174
 
International Encyclopedia Of The Social
 
Sciences, 196b ed., s.v. "brainwashing," by Albert Somit.
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what took place during the brainwashing process in Korea.
 
The purpose was to show that no matter what school of
 
thought came in to play regarding these theoretical aspects
 
of brainwashing, one key factor clearly stood out--the
 
breakdown of group cohesion.
 
The effectiveness of Chinese brainwashing will be
 
discussed in the following chapter.
 
V. THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE BRAINWASHING PROCESS
 
Approximately one month after the first group of
 
Americans landed in Korea, an article entitled "The FLA
 
Policy For War Prisoners" was published in People's China,
 
a Communist magazine. The article dealt with the success
 
that the Chinese Communist's experienced in the "anti-

Japanese Wars" as well as during the revolution in winning
 
over their enemies, mainly because of their treatment of
 
prisoners. This poicy included lenient treatment, separa
 
tion of officers from enlisted, lectures and discussions
 
about China, and "accusation meetings," where the prisoners
 
discussed the suffering they experienced under their ,
 
governments. The Chinese objectives were "to win them
 
[POWs] over, re-educate them, and gradually remould their
 
ideology and behavior." Even if they could not be re
 
educated in such a short time, two or three months was
 
sufficient "to make them politically neutral. Such persons
 
were no longer willing to risk their lives for a lost
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cause."
 
The importance of Chiu Kang's article is two-fold:
 
first, many writers on the subject of brainwashing have
 
175
Chiu Kang, "The PLA Policy For War Prisoners,"
 
People's China, 1 August, 1950, pp. 8-9.
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stated that ideologleal remoulding was the Chinese
 
1 T6
 
objective of brainwashing. (This was also admitted
 
by the Chinese in this same article prior to their entrance
 
into the Korean War.) Second, their success was measured
 
by the degree of ideological change and/or neutralization
 
in the prisoner's behavior.
 
The extent of ideological change which took place
 
in Korea, according to Edgar Schein, "is difficult to
 
evaluate because of the...hazards in measuring ideological
 
change, and because of the impossibility of determining the
 
177
 
latent effects of the indoctrination." It seems,
 
however, that twenty-one American prisoners capitulated to
 
the brainwashing techniques of their captors. Virginia
 
Pasley has suggested that this number would have been much
 
larger had it not been for a twist of fate. She contends
 
that approximately one hundred days prior to the armistice
 
1 T6

Biderman, March To Calumny, p. 70; Hunter,
 
Brainwashing; From Pavlov to Powers, p. 50; Pasley, 21
 
Stayed, pp. 236-237; Scheflin, The Mind Manipulators,
 
p. by; Schein, "The Chinese Indoctrination Program For
 
Prisoners Of War," p. 169; Henry Ai Segal, "Initial
 
Psychiatric Findings Of Recently Repatriated Prisoners
 
Of War," American Journal Of Psychiatry 111 (1954):
 
358; Peter Watson,: War On The Mind (N^ York; Basic
 
Books, Inc., 1978), p. 288.
 
'1-77 ■ ' ■ ■ ; ' 
Schein, '^The Chinese Indoctrination Program For
 
Prisoners Of War," p. 169. ; ^ ^ ^ ^ ^
 
79 
being signed,1TS the Chinese returned (in Operation Little
 
Switch) 149 prisoners to United Nation's control. They
 
consisted of the sick and wounded, as well as "progres
 
sives" who were planted to spread Communist propaganda in
 
the United States. Sixty days after they were returned,
 
the Chinese learned that almost fifteen thousand Chinese
 
prisoners of the United Nations refused to return home.
 
This came as a shock to the Chinese, who felt that in
 
response they had to have some American prisoners refuse
 
repatriation. They therefore had only forty days to
 
"develop a token force to keep back and had to pick those
 
whom their methods would soften up most quickly." The
 
group they had to pick from was depleted from their most
 
advanced progressives, due to their sending them off
 
prematurely.179 If the Chinese had the foresight to hold
 
off sending back to the States the progressives during
 
Operation Little Switch, it is probable that they would
 
have kept them in China. Edgar Schein believes that the
 
main reason these twenty-one refused repartiation was not
 
due to a change in ideology, but from fear of the charges
 
that would be brought against them for misconduct upon
 
1T8
See Appendix 6 for Korean War Chronology.
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'^Palsey, 21 Stayed, p. 228.
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theiri return to the United States. It would
 
therefore follow that the methods used "to soften" the
 
twenty-one who stayed highlighted this fact.
 
In view of the fact that only twenty-one Americans
 
stayed with the Chinese182 compared to the 14,704
 
Chinese who stayed with the United Nations forces, Schein
 
believes that "In terms of overt criteria of conversion or
 
ideological change, one can only conclude that, considering
 
the effort devoted to it, the Chinese program was a
 
18^
 failure." This Conclusion is widely accepted by
 
184
 
many other writers on this topic as well. It was.
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Schein, "The, Chinese Indoctrination Program For
 
Prisoners Of War," p. 165.
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The main reason the 14,704 Chinese prisoners
 
decided to stay with the West was due to successful indoc
 
trination by the United States, and not due to fear of
 
charges being brought against them. The success of U.S*
 
indoctrination centered on kind treatment of their Chinese
 
(and North Korean) prisoners. The main difference between
 
brainwashing and indoctrination is that brainwashing uses
 
violence and aggressiveness as its basis, while indoctri
 
nation uses kind treatment; see White, The Captives Of
 
Korea, pp. 111-117.
 
^^^As of 1978, "fewer than ten" have failed to
 
return; see Scheflin, The Mind Manipulators, p. 89.
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Schein, "The Chinese Indoctrination Program For
 
Prisoners Of War," p. 169.
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Biderman, March To. Calumny, pp. 74-75;
 
Scheflin, The Mind Manipulators, p. 89; Segal, "Initial
 
V-y.
 
as in BidermanVs words, "a resounding flop."''^^
 
Since the Chinese were, for the most part, not as
 
effective as they would have liked their brainwashing of
 
American POWs to be in terms of ideological conversibn, it
 
would seem that American concern pVer brainwashing would
 
end. The reason it did not, however, was due to some in
 
teresting incidents which took place in the POW camps. The
 
general public (with the help of the media), claimed that
 
these incidents were the result of successful brainwashing.
 
The most significant charges were that one out of every
 
three prisoners collaborated, with one out of every seven
 
collaborating seriously. Moreover, not one prisoner es
 
caped from a permanent camp and the death rate among pris­
18fi
 
oners was higher than any war in our nation's history.
 
After repatriationj the U.S. Army conducted
 
extensive Studies on the returnees which centered around
 
psychiatric evaluations and counterintelligence.^^'^
 
Subsequently, individuals were placed Into three categories
 
Psychiatric Findings Of Recently Repatriated Prisoners Of
 
War,;", p.. 363. .,';
 
Biderman, March To Calumny, pp. 74-75.
 
Klnkead, In Every War But One v pp. 16-17;
 
U.S. Congress, House, Communist Psychological Warfare
 
(Brainwashing p. 15.
 
^^"^Kinkead, In Every War But One, pp. 40-41.
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aeeordlng to their oonduot while captives: participators
 
(also known as proVs and progressives), resisters, or
 
middle men (also known as neutrals).
 
PartiGipators^-Fifteen per cent of the men fell
 
in this catagory.' Thdse were men recorome
court rosrtial. ; pr dishonorable discharge...plus
 
those who would have fallenhed they not already been In either categorydischarged from the 
military service^ 
Resisters—Five per cent of 
category. These were 
the men fell in this 
who were 
recommended for decoration as a result of their
 
meritorious behavior in captivity, plus those who
 
committed at least two distinct acts of
 
resistance in internment and against whom there
 
was no derogatory information.
 
Middle Men—.Eighty per cent of the men fell in
 
this category. These were men...whom the Army

had compiled little or no derogatory information,
 
or conflicting information.188
 
The two groups who were of most cpoeern to the Army beGause
 
of collaboration wdre the "participators" and the "middle
 
.fmen.'" ;■ 
As stated earlier, collaboration on the part of the 
prisoners Was reportedly widespread. Most charges were 
based on acts such as filling out phoney Red Cross forms or 
signing peace petitions. A smaller nufflber of individuals, 
referred to as partleipators, "engaged in persistent 
collaboration which included writing, signing, and 
soliciting signatures for peace petitions, delivering 
188^ ■ ' Segal, "Correlates Of Collaboration And
Resistance Behavior Among U.S. Army POWs In Korea," p. 32 
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anti-United Nations lectures to other POWs, aiding in the
 
preparation and distribution of communist (sic) propaganda,
 
encouraging fellow POWs to collaborate, informing on other
 
POWs, and generally aiding the Chinese in their indoctri­
189

nation program." The above quote is similar to the
 
definition of collaboration found in The Random House
 
Dictionary Of The English Language, which is, "to cooper­
190
 
ate, esp. willingly, with an enemy of one's country."
 
Based on this definition, it is interesting to note that
 
out of the 3,973 Army POWs repatriated, 425 were initially
 
considered for court-martial, but only forty-seven were
 
officially slated for court-martial. Of these forty-seven,
 
fourteen were brought to trial but only ten were found
 
191/19?
guilty. ^ . Additionally, it should be pointed out that
 
another group of 210 POWs were discharged prior to their
 
being charged for their actions in the camps. Conse
 
quently, they were out of the Army's jurisdiction, but not
 
out of the jurisdiction of the. Department of Justice.
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Edgar Schein, "Distinguishing Characteristics
 
Of Collaboration And Resistance Among American Prisoners Of
 
War," Journal Of Abnormal Psychology 55 (1958), p. 197.
 
190
 
The Random House Dictionary Of the English
 
Language, Unab. ed., (1971), s.v. "collaboration." ~
 
191See Appendix 4, Table 3 for comparisons
 
between the services regarding collaboration.
 
192Biderman, March To Calumny, p. 36.
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After studying the matter for several years however, the
 
Department of Justice decided to take no action against
 
IQO
 
these men. The reason for this is two-fold; first,
 
the subject was not very popular with the public since they
 
perceived the enlisted man as getting stiffen sentences
 
than thoses received by the officers during the Army
 
194

trials. And second, many years had passed since
 
their repatriation,, and m^ich time, :money, and effort would
 
■ ' ■ , , -v, 
be wasted trying to locate all the people involved in these
 
cases. Moreover, It Was also likely that much relevant
 
information would have been forgotten.195 Thus, even
 
if the trials did take place, few, if any, would have been
 
convicted. Officially, based on legal criteria, "only 10
 
196

of 4,000 have been proven guilty of 'collaboration.'"
 
Such a low number should not have caused such great alarm.
 
Julius Segal, in addressing the neutralization of
 
the "middle men," has stated that although they did not
 
collaborate, they did not resist the Chinese either. What
 
took place was that when confronted with the stresses of
 
193

Kinkead, March To Calumny, p. 75.
 
194_. .p

Ibid, p. 68.
 
^^^Ibid, p. 75.
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Biderman, March To Calumny, p. 37.
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prison camp life, they withdrew from the situation. In so
 
doing, they were not a threat to the Chinese, and were
 
easy to control In addition, they showed the
 
Communists that they did not care enough about America
 
and/or their duty as soldiers to continue the war while
 
prisoners. Such behavior, Segal believes, was a victory
 
for the Communists (as they themselves so claimed^ , and
 
further stated it was "an indictment of the American's own
 
indoctrination of its men."^^^
 
Historically, it would be safe to state that in
 
all wars, some POWs collaborated with their enemy. For
 
example, it was found that during the Civil War, approxi
 
mately 3,170 Union soldiers went over to the Confederate
 
side, and abopt 5,450 Confederates went over to the Union's
 
side. There were instances not only of collaboration with
 
the enemy, but also of what might be referred to as
 
"traitorous actions." In one case, a whole company of
 
"reconstructed" Confederate soldiers was sent to man a
 
197Strassman, Thaler, and Schein agree with Segal
 
on this matter, and go into greater detail on the subject
 
in, "A Prisoner Of War Syndrome: Apathy As A Reaction To
 
Severe Stress;" see Harvey D. Strassman, Margaret B.
 
Thaler, and Edgar H. Schein, "A Prisoner Of War Syndrome:
 
Apathy As A Reaction To Severe Stress," American Journal
 
Of Psychiatry 112 (1954): 998-1003. ~
 
198Kang, "The PLA Policy For War Prisoners," p. 8,
 
199Watson, War On The Mind, p. 297.
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Union outpost so that those soldiers could be sent to fight
 
the South on an important front. During World War II,
 
the policy was that after giving name, rank, and serial
 
201
 
number, the soldier was to "maintain silence." let in
 
testimony to the Department of Uustice in 19''19, Hanns
 
Scharff, referred to as the "Luftwaffe's Master Interroga­
tor," claimed that in his years as an interrogator
 
at AusWerstelle West, Oberursel, Germany, he interviewed
 
over five hundred downed airmen. From these interroga­
tiohs, he reported that he obtained the precise information
 
208
 
he wanted from "all but a handful." Although his
 
techniques were somewhat different than the brainwashing
 
204
 
that took place in Korea, the facts still remain:
 
^^^U.S., Secretary Of Defense, POW: The Fight
 
Continues After The Battle, p. 51.
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Ibid, p. 59.
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Raymond F. Toliver, The Interrogator: The
 
Story Of Hanns Scharff, Luftwaffe's Master Interrogator
 
(Fallbrook: Aero Books, 197b). ~ . ~~~
 
20^
 
U.S., Secretary Of Defense, POW: The Fight
 
Continues After The Battle, p. 59.
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Hanns Scharff mainly relied on friendliness,
 
with his main approaches being the "walking conference" and
 
the "deception" techniques (see Appendix 5). I would also
 
submit that a "consciousness of kind" was working in his
 
favor also, as he was Anglo and spoke perfect English, with
 
no accent. See Toliver, The Interrogator: The Story Of
 
Hanns Scharff, Luftwaffe's Master Interrogator, pp. 62-113.
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American POWs in the examples cited above, gave information
 
to the enemy.
 
Therefore, since collaboration and misconduct by
 
prisoners has always occurred in war, what took place in
 
Korea should not be cause for undue concern. What should
 
be of more concern is that ninety-five percent of the
 
prisoners were neutralized by the Chinese brainwashing
 
techniques.205 This result was largely due to the
 
breakdown of the group. Had the prisoners banded together,
 
they would have,made a formidable force behind the wire (as
 
were the Turks). Since they did not do this, it enabled
 
the development of participators and middle men who failed
 
in their duties ^ s soldiers and Americans.
 
Another factor which caused considerable criticism
 
was the fact that not one prisoner escaped from a permanent
 
Korean prisoner of war camp. Had the facts been fully
 
known, the public would have realized that any escape would
 
have had to overcome many serious obstacles in order to
 
make his way back to friendly lines.
 
Earlier in this paper, it was stated that it would
 
have been easy for a prisoner to escape from his captors in
 
205
 
The ninety-five percent includes not only the
 
middle men, but the participators as well. The reason for
 
including the participators in this percentage is that in
 
order to collaborate, they first had to be successfully
 
neutralized.
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the permanent camp since he was usually not guarded or
 
or\f\/ocsT
 
securely confined. The first steps then, in order
 
to escape, would be to avoid having the Chinese know of
 
one's plan through an informer, and to overcome the fear of
 
being recaptured by the North Koreans, whose treatment of
 
American prisoners was found to be brutal. Assuming that
 
these obstacles were overcome, the next problem would be
 
the great distance one would have to travel to reach
 
friendly lines. This distance could be anywhere from two
 
hundred to three hundred miles^(the journey most likely
 
would be on foot208)j by one who probably was in a severely
 
weakened physical condition. The journey, moreover, would
 
consist of travel through narrow valleys, which was charac
 
teristic of the terrain, and crawling with Chinese or North
 
Korean soldiers. Perhaps the greatest problem one would
 
have to overcome was the disguising of one's features. It
 
206„ oo ->0
 
See pp. 32-33.
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Schein, "The Chinese Indoctrination Program For
 
Prisoners Of War," p. 152.
 
208Biderman has stated that, "The situation was
 
quite different from that of previous wars in that the only
 
routes home in Korea were the seas or the fighting line...
 
There was no neutral shipping tied up in the ports of North
 
Korea; in fact, there were no ports left to speak of, so
 
that even this difficult but time-honored opening for
 
escape was closed to the Korean POW's."; see Biderman,
 
March To Calumny, p. 87.
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would be extremely hard to disguise oneself as an Oriental,
 
especially if a Negro. And lastly, if by some stroke of
 
luck the front lines were reached, the POW would still have
 
to execute the very dangerous passage through the lines.
 
With the daily changing of passwords, it is impossible for
 
a POW to know the proper countersign to a challenge, and
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would risk being shot by his own forces. ^
 
Albert Biderman has compared the above circum
 
stances to those of the German soldiers who were prisoners
 
in the United States during World War II. There were
 
435,788 German POWs interned in the United States at this
 
time, and only twenty eight escaped. These were not
 
considered successful escapes however, since none of them
 
could get out of the country. After the cessation of
 
hostilities, all were found living in the United States
 
under assumed names. The only reason these escapes were
 
successful was because they could pass as Americans with
 
210
 little difficulty. Relating this to the predicament of
 
the prisoners in Korea who found themselves in an obviously
 
different environment, the American PGWs had little, if any
 
hope for escape.
 
In his discussion on the deaths of American
 
^^^Ibid, pp. 86-88.
 
^^°Ibid, pp. 89-90.
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prisoners Eugene Kinkead found that 2,320 of the 7,190 POWs
 
held in captivity died in Korea. This was described as "a
 
higher prisoner death rate than that of any of our previous
 
wars."
211 Oddly enough, contrary to past wars where the
 
captor's barbaric treatment of prisoners was given as the
 
reason for prisoner deaths, in Korea, the fault was put on
 
the prisoners. Biderraan, in reaction to this has stated:
 
"The logic of regarding the victim rather than the perpe
 
trator of the submarginal conditions in Korea as 'primarily
 
responsible' for the high death rate...is like saying that
 
the mugging victim is respdnslble for the injuries and
 
losses he suffers because he does not have the strength
 
or training in judo to fight off his attacker." Thus,
 
although the press and some writers fault the POWs for the
 
high number of deaths, the truth of the matter is that the
 
conditions they were forced to endure caused most of the
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deaths.
 
in response to the accusation that the high death
 
rate should be a matter of concern, Biderman noted that in
 
Korea, most of the POWs who died, did so during the first
 
213
 
year of the war. He then compared the death rates
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Kinkead, In Every War But One, p. 17.
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Biderman, March To Calumny, p. 92.
 
213
 
See Appendix 4 for Tables.
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during the first year of imprisonment of American PGWs in
 
Korea with the first year of imprisonment of American POWs
 
in World War II. His data shows that the death rates were
 
high for both groups. In Korea, thirty-eight percent of
 
the POWs died during the first year of the war, whereas
 
in World War II, sixty percent (1,492 out of 2,200 U.S.
 
prisoners) died in six weeks at Camp O'Donhel in the
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Philippines while captives of the Japanese.
 
In view of the hbove statiStiGS, tj^e seemingly high
 
death rate for Korea was not different than the death rates
 
of prisoners held by the Japanese. The Korean death rates
 
can be seen as a consequence of brainwashing, but it should
 
not be attributed to the effectiveness of the process,
 
since the Chinese were not out to kill the prisoners; they
 
merely wished to change their thinking about the war and
 
Communism.
 
Dr. Harold G. Wolff, who researched the subject of
 
brainwashing for the Central Intelligence Agency, summed
 
up the Korean POW experience as follows: "The behavior
 
of American prisoners of war...was in general not very
 
different from that of other armies and places, but was
 
obviously made to appear much worse by the enemyis propa
 
ganda devices and our own initital ineptitude in countering
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Biderman, March To Calumny, p. 102.
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enemy propaganda."215 By failing to counter this
 
propaganda, a brainwashing scare was used as a scapegoat to
 
rationalize what took place in the Korean prisoner of war
 
camps. Since brainwashing was something new and mysterious
 
to the West, it was used to label anything that could not
 
be easily explained. This eventually led to the formation
 
of a committee in 1955 by the Secretary of Defense to
 
investigate what went on in the POW camps. The responsi
 
bility of this committee was to establish specific guide
 
lines for FOWs (and for soldiers in general) to abide by in
 
future wars.
 
On July 29th, 1955, the above mentioned committee
 
published its findings and recommendations. They concluded
 
that, "Although all services had regulations, the U.S.
 
Armed Forces have never had a clearly defined code of
 
conduct applicable to American prisoners after capture.
 
There are piece-meal legal restrictions and regulations but
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no comprehensive codification." Consequently, the
 
World War II policy of "name, rank, and service number" was
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carried into the Korean War. The official consensus
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Scheflin, The Mind Manipulators, p. 89.
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U.S., Secretary Of Defense, POW; The Fight
 
Continues After The Battle, pp. v-vii, "5"!
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Modifications of this code took place during the
 
Korean War. The Army's modification was that a prisoner
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of the.committee was that only a "minority" of the POWs
 
were guilty of misconduct in Korea. However, the members
 
felt that a code of conduct would be helpful to POWs in the
 
future. In addition to the code, "each member of the Armed
 
Forces liable to capture must be provided with specific
 
training designed to equip him better to cope with all
 
enemy efforts against him. He will be fully instructed as
 
to his behavior and obllga,tions in combat and in the event
 
O "1 R ' "
 
of capture. On August 17, 1955, Executive Order
 
10631, A Code Of Conduct For Members Of The Armed Forces Of
 
The United States, was signed by President Dwight D.
 
Eisenhower.219 In this writer's opinion, two important
 
guidelines resulting from the brainwashing of U.S. Army
 
prisoners in Korea are contained in this code: first,
 
maintain group cohesion, and second, do not give up the
 
fight once captured. The promulgation of this executive
 
order officially closed all matters pertaining to the
 
did not have to stop at "name, rank, and service number"
 
as long as military information was not given. (No over
 
whelming evidence of violations of this code was found
 
in this writer's research.) See Biderman, March To
 
Calumny, pp. 232-233.
 
p18
 
U.S., Secretary Of Defense, POW: The Fight
 
Continues After The Battle, pp. 19, 25.
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Kinkead, In Every War But One, pp. 19-20.
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Korean prisoner of war ordeal, and also focused on the
 
future conduct of all U.S. servicemen during wartime. The
 
rules regulating one's conduct are listed below:
 
■ CODE OF COMDUCT 
I : The Articles V
 
1. I am an American fighting man. I serve in
 
the forces which guard my country and our way of
 
life. I am prepared to give my life in their
 
.defense..- ,
 
2. I will never surrender 6f my own free will.
 
If in command, I will never surrender my men
 
while they still have the means to resist.
 
3. If I am captured I will continue to resist by
 
all means available. I will make every effort to
 
escape and aid others to escape. I will accept
 
neither parole nor special favors from the enemy.
 
4. If I become a prisoner of war, I will keep
 
faith with my fellow prisoners. I will give no
 
information nor take part in any action which
 
might be harmful to my comrades. If I am senior,
 
I will take command. If not, I will obey the
 
lawful orders of those appointed over me and will
 
back them up In every way.
 
5. When questioned, should I become a prisoner
 
of war, I am bound to give only name, rank,
 
service number and date of birth. I will evade
 
answering further questions to the utmost of my
 
ability. I will make no oral or written
 
statements disloyal to my country and its allies
 
or harmful to their cause.
 
6. I will never forget that I am an American
 
fighting man, responsible for my actions, and
 
dedicated to the principles which made my country
 
free. I will trusfepnin my God and in the United
 
States Of America.
 
^^°Ibid, p. 40.
 
VI. CONCLUSION
 
When Mao Tse-Tung became the Chairman of the
 
Chinese Communist Party in 1949, he re-emphasized that the
 
breakdown of the group was essentia:!. in order for the
 
Communists to gain control of the masses. This theory was
 
put into actual practice during the Civil War in China
 
between the Chinese Communists and Chiang K'ai-shek's
 
Nationalists and during the Korean War against the American
 
Army personnel captured by the Chinese Communists.
 
The U.S. Army went to war in Korea in response to
 
the June 25, 1950 invasion of South Korea by North Korea.
 
The American soldiers were mentally unprepared for the
 
conflict because they were mostly untrained soldiers of a
 
peace-time era thrown into battle with little, if any,
 
information about their foe or reasons why the U.S. was
 
fighting in Korea. Consequently, with the entrance of
 
China into the war, those soldiers captured by the Chinese
 
were susceptible to brainwashing. Furthermore, they were
 
not fore-warned of China's techniques of brainwashing and
 
what they entailed. It was not until the repatriation of
 
the POW's that the brainwashing process received widespread
 
attention.
 
The key factor in the Chinese's success in brain
 
washing Army prisoners lay in their ability to break down
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the group's cohesion. Various interpretations and examples
 
of their methods were presented. All were shown to have
 
merit and all emphasized the breakdown of group cohesion as
 
the key factor in brainwashing.
 
It was shown that the American POWs fared no worse
 
in Korea than American POW's of past wars. Furthermore,
 
the brainwashing scare that follov/ed the repatriation of
 
the prisoners was intensified by the false perception the
 
public had of a mysterious oriental process which the
 
prisoners were thought to have been subjected to.
 
The Chinese's success in terms of ideological
 
conversion was extremely limited, since only twenty-one
 
Americans stayed with their captors. It was suggested that
 
these men probably remained in China because they believed
 
that charges would be brought against them for misconduct
 
when they returned. In terms of social control, it was
 
concluded that the Communists were quite effective since
 
ninety-five percent of the American POWs were successfully
 
neutralized and did not continue to fight once behind the
 
wire. It is this writer's opinion that the Chinese brain
 
washing program came to an end not only because the
 
prisoner lists were exchanged (as Dixon claimed), but also
 
because they could see the results of their program. Even
 
though there were few (if any) conversions, the enormous
 
success in controlling the prisoners made the brainwashing
 
program worth the Chinese's effort. With almost total
 
97 
social control, there was no need to expend any more
 
effort. Thus the program came to an end.
 
In Edgar Schein's summary of the brainwashing
 
process used by the Chinese in Korea, he stated that there
 
was an "attempt to use a combination of...techniques and
 
apply them simultaneously in order to gain complete control
 
over significant portions of the physical and social
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environment of a group of people." The Communists
 
gained control of the prisoner population by destroying
 
their group cohesion. In responsb to their predicament,
 
the POWs became passive and inactive.
 
The outcpme of the Korean PGW experience, particu
 
larly in light of the inaction" by the majority of the
 
prisoners, prompted an investigative committee to be
 
formed by the Secretary of Defense. It recommended a Code
 
■i ' ■ ' • ' ' ■ ' ■ 
of Conduot to be used as a giiide for all members of the 
Armed Forces. The code stipulates how soldiers must behave 
if they become prisoners. Had this code been written and 
adopted earlier, it could have alleviated many of the 
problems which occurred in Korea. The most important 
statements in the code which pertain to group cohesion 
were: (1) "I will continue to resist by all means avail 
able;" (2) "I will accept neither parole nor special favors 
221
Schein, "The Chinese Indoctrination Program For 
Prisoners Of War," p. 172. 
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from the enemy;" (3) "I will keep faith in my fellow
 
prisoners and give no information nor take part in any
 
action which might be harmful to my comrades;" (4) "If I am
 
senior, I will take command. If not I will obey the lawful
 
orders of those appointed over me and will back them up in
 
every way;" and (5) "I will make no oral or written state
 
ment disloyal to my country The code also stressed the
 
reason why the soldier should resist the enemy: "I will
 
never forget that I am an American fighting man, respon
 
sible for my actions, and dedicated to the principles which
 
made my country free. I will trust in my God and in the
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United States of America." The soldier is therefore
 
compelled to follow the code in order to help preserve the
 
group's solidarity and our country's values.
 
In conclusion, future U.S. Army POW's Captured by
 
Communist forces will probably be treated in the same
 
manner as the Korean War FOWs. The first step to counter
 
this treatment was taken when the Code Of Conduct was
 
implemented. The second step is taking place today. The
 
U.S. Army is testing the "Regimental Concept," in which
 
soldiers will spend their entire Army career with the same
 
regiment. In as early as 1959, it was submitted that such
 
222
 
U.S., Secretary Of Defense, POW: The Fight
 
Continues After The Battle, p. 40.
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a program would be needed to develop and maintain group
 
cohesion in the U.S. Army. The rationale is that it "will
 
enable a soldier to identify more strongly with those men
 
immediately around him, and, as a result, greatly increase
 
his loyalty to them. The unit should thus be more effec
 
tive in combat, and, if any of its members are captured,
 
they should, through this group solidarity, be more able—•
 
as were the Turks and Marines—to resist pressure in a
 
22^

prison camp." In the final analysis, brainwashing
 
would not be effective if one's bond to his group is
 
strong.
 
^^^Kinkead, In Every War But One, pp. 202-203.
 
APPENDIX 1 (Propaganda Leaflets Used By The Chinese And
 
Americans In The Korean War)
 
The following are actual Korean Era leaflets
 
which were professionally reproduced for this
 
thesis. The originals were of newspaper quality
 
and yellowed with age. Source: Charles J.
 
Nilsson, (LTC, Ret), Assistant G-3, 2nd Infantry
 
Division, Korea, 1950-1951.
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 Leaflet Given As Safe Conduct Pass For 2nd Infantry
 
Division Men Capture By The Chinese And Released
 
Side 1
 
What Is She Thinking NOW?
 
c<o>vLe Cx:>c-S.ScayJyX'UvY
FOUND ON
 
)rCt^\(yu.X' :(^A.

THE BODY
 
OF A DEAD
 Id:S- -fcK^j.

AMERICAN
 
S O L D I E R
 
^O- £UApp<r^ flA
 
■<^tCKA. Crujt Cr^ ) 
C-^AAAX^Z . l^£4J^.CudAJ aex-yy^ < 
EVERYONE HAS
 .)
■Ck_ (AjCrC^^<^C^'Ccx ^^y^ 
SOMEONE
 ''CrM, XThrjr 'H-vxx/C^ XCf^xCj 
TO LIVE 7 
FOR iTT^'c/crt^ {knn^ 
m 
You CAN get out 
ol this 
vA. 
V. 
{uofiteers' war|t t ^ Ln'vT^; 
nmVt filiS »i» *-«b.Eib. 
STOP FlGHTlNjO FOR DUPONT AND MORGAN 
SAFE CONDUCT PASS 
(lf«r o«l) THEN WHAT? 
Say 
You'll no lo the rear to salrtv
-'cr>htV Tow Shong W 
( «uiT'<u<l<>'') 
aii<l get lioiiic In llic end. i ui ulow rkyair* with tkow. Shof*« rhymo# wIlW loog. 
Salcly ami good Ireatmenl over Bce wlial your l)ii(i(lie8
Iof l»earer are guarantee<l 
Th» Chinef People's Volunteer Porcet ill 
 Communist Leaflets Disseminated In South Korea (Originated
 
In POW Camp)
 
I appeal to you as a p.o.w.
 
: My fellow Officers and Men of the U.S. Army!
 
I am a U.S. pow of the people's Army and have
 
been treated with the utmost care. We have no
 
reason to fight these peoples as they are trying
 
to unify the country as one nation. Korean
 
people want to have peace so the only way for
 
them to have it is for all foreign troops to
 
withdraw from the Korean soil. As soon
 
as the troops withdraw from the Korean
 
soil all the P.O.W.s can go back to their
 
sweet home.
 
Please Fellow! Give up your guns!
 
And surrender to the people's army'or
 
withdraw from Korea so you may go
 
your families and wives.
 
pvt Charles R. Kirtler
 
Co G 38 Inf Regt.
 
2nd Inf Div
 
C-^ /-^ /y 0­
CkA ^yj- •'ta^T^ ■^yj'
oXj2. /p. o. (xJ.'o 6"-^ 
C— j* <r^ (^O^yL -Oyf T^~ 
■ j /O . .' C ' 
Side 1 
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Communist Leaflet Disseminated in South Korea (Originated
 
In POW Camp)
 
Side 1
 
Be 
:l« • 
1..M 
humbleevff 
plac likeno 
List ink' 
I'OW's 
of f.tr .iw.iy 
^ 
I 
i. >. '-t . 
I'k/ V, ;»ic I
 
v -.P..,
 
DO TRY TO FINi) A NEWWAV
 
TO lli:STOIlATION TO LIFE FHO-M
 
TJIK DAIIKEST (lATE OF D'EATLF.
 
rV:vr friends!
 
Vo ;.:v deocivcd aiid t:ikt:n lo ll»c batilc field of av»^:ririiiion of • ''jiM
 
rr.d d;iv* j» btn» by ttep lo tl;e of yo<ir tUulh by tlkc U.S. imi^Ti.di>ib
 
Mwdd! '
 
Tlic Koic.tiv i*o>plo*3 Army, omtinuini: irresistible march to\v.ir»l.
 
fo .til like ; i\ nnj^Y' have r.lrtvidy f.looed every aveiiue of >i.4ir
 
csc:t^>c^ l.ven ih.f Chunra I'<>okilo hiul Ouinra-Nanido arc coin;»UMi ly
 
liberatWl 'i l.eiv v.re, mm' Uicio arc rom.iinctl only and s ;.,)i
 
cleatix s dcvir oil) . l-'n San and Cl.iu-Ilai the liUaations »jf which an?
 
only a fivicstion tu time.
 
On the imxintains, the partisans 2Lrc wailing for yon. And in the
 
CcVls als-j the of Korea are watching for you.
 
S p;*">eyr >ou oouldi escape to live end I
 
The hi;;h waves running loiigh of Uio korcAn Straits will watiih your
 
retrr.'K
 
\\hci^ver yixi nvay try to ci^ipe you can iwn^cr find out even a
 
single ;.ven-.!e of e>vapt\ becaitse noUxly and riotlting will try to wehbine
 
\oa. The.ro'.Wc ihe only way to |>? alive is to » •iTender to the Kouran
 
vh-*i Ai iiv>'v 1 f surrciidtM, > 4)« will be able ip live here in i<5;k.c
 
TGvieving v,-;irnv protection and go back your sweet Iwme to see your
 
tmm dear, dear nvother and wife.
 
Don't bojome at the gate of death. Dp tum::*4cr «s s#>ort aa
 
pccsible not hesitatingi
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 Araerican Leaflet Disseminated in North Korea—Psychological
 
Warfare and Other Actions Resulted In Over 23,000 Communist
 
POW's Refusing Repatriation At The Cessation Of Hostilities
 
0 V
 
_:-$OLplS^ 0? THE UH:K)ECES!
 
Tlil ^icate a^ntee8 go0d ^7h4v ®1 -S*
 
any eneiny eoldier 
-2: m 
, •!$
 
tS
dirirthg to cease fighting. Take
 
this man to your nearest officer of
 
and treat him as' en honorable
 
^prisoner of war, /
 
DOTK^AS MacAETHlTft
 
General of the Amy ■i-ii siilCommander-in-Chief 
oi Sf ^V 
i!7 
/I v4V s s. 
MM 
nar 
&?] 
Oh r-S: ijH 
ja. 0 
tH4 u t? J2, ^ tV 
a tVt-J- f -2- 7K-9-/'I
3C: H JLVIiV7).Wp6 
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American Leaflet Disseminated In North Korea
 
A 
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APPENDIX 2 (Brainwashing: Related Terms)
 
Advertising
 
Brain-changing
 
Brain-warfare
 
Coercive Persuasion
 
Corticovisceral Psychiatry
 
Dialecticla Persuasion
 
Education
 
Ideological Reform
 
Ideological Remoulding
 
Indoctrination
 
Mass Hypnotism
 
Mental Douche
 
Menticide
 
Mind Reform and Re-education
 
Narcohypnosis
 
Persuasion
 
Public Relations
 
Psychological Artillery
 
Psychological Mass Coercion
 
Psychological Mass Control
 
Psycho-surgery
 
Self-criticism
 
Self-cultivation
 
Socialization
 
Soul-surgery
 
Though Reform
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APPENDIX 3 (Map Showing Position Of Temporary And Permanent
 
POW Camps And The Position Of United Nations Forces
 
At Various Stages In The Korean War)
 
CHINA
 
Ch'angin 
Permanent
 
Camps
 
.Kanggye
 
!h'osan
 
yktong ^ ^ 
 
Antun^ 190 ^^^Pj^Tch-ong

>Usan ^ ^October 24, 1950 
nanju S 
SEA OF 
Temporary 
Camps 
►/S^\YONGY.^^N€l^ JAPAN 
nggang
June 1951-July 1953 
ODE 
V*38 
SEOUL March 1951
Inch o 
YELLOW 
SEA Yongdok 
•Kasan 
August 1950 
KOREA 
10 5 0 10 30 SO usan 
UN Position 
Source: Biderman, March To Calumny, pp. 96, 202. 
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APPENDIX 4 (Statistics Applicable To The Korean
 
POW Experience)
 
Table 1 (Numbers Who Died And Numbers Who Survived Among
 
U.S. Army Personnel Known Captured In Each Period
 
Of The Korean War)
 
Period 

Captured 

Jun-Oct 1950 

Nov 1950-Feb 1951 

Mar-Jun 1951 

Jul 1951-Apr 1952 

May 1952-Mar 1953 

Apr-Jul 1953 

Number 

Captured 

1,037 

4,139 

975 

234 

130 

139 

Number
 
Died
 
575
 
1,896
 
165
 
15
 
9
 
0
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"Table 2 (Fate Of U.S. Array Personnel Captured In Korea)
 
Survivors:
 
Repatriated 3,326
 
Escaped, evaded, or released
 
at the front 647
 
Refused repatriation 20
 
TOTAL SURVIVORS 3,993
 
Died In Eneray Territory;
 
Died in authenticated atrocities 1,036
 
Died in POW caraps 2,634
 
Missing; evidence indicated
 
captured, but phesuraed dead 244*
 
Refused repatriation, dead in
 
eneray territory
 
TOTAL KNOWN OR PRESUMED DEAD 3,915
 
TOTAL KNOWN OR BELIEVED TO HAVE
 
BEEN IN ENEMY HAND 7,908
 
*This total does not include the 2,237 men who were listed
 
as missing in action at the end of 1953. Moreover, no
 
information exists to indicate that any of these raen were
 
captured.
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Table 3 (Number And Percent Of Repatriated Prisoners Of
 
War Of Each Service Suspected Of Misconduct Who
 
Required Further Investigation)
 
Service
 
Army 

Air Force 

Marine Corps 

Navy 

ALL SERVICES 

Total
 
Repatriated
 
3,973
 
224
 
200
 
31
 
4,428
 
Number Percent
 
"Required "Required
 
Further Further
 
Investigation" Investigation"
 
426 11%
 
87 39%
 
52 26%
 
0
 
565 13%
 
Source: Biderman, March To Calumny, Table 1-p. Ill;
 
Table 2-p. 94; Table 3-p. 30.
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APPENDIX 5 (Communist Techniques Of Interrogation Used
 
In Korea)
 
1. DECEPTION—A common practice of the Communists was to
 
request the prisoner to prepare a TOE (Table Of Organiza
 
tion And Equipment) of his military organization as it
 
stood at the time of his capture. If he gave false infor
 
mation the interrogator would produce the correct answer
 
from the United States field manual. The prisoner was then
 
given a long lecture on lying and warned that further
 
falsification would not be tolerated. The enemy asked the
 
same question again and had the prisoner give the correct
 
answer. He was then told that the enemy had all the
 
correct answers and that he was asked such questions simply
 
to test his honesty. If the prisoner fell into this trap',
 
he was open for further interrogations and deceptions. On
 
the TOE question and many others the enemy did have the
 
correct answers; however, he did not have the correct
 
answers to all the questions he asked—if he had he would
 
not have needed to interrogate any prisoners. The
 
Communists continued by representing the whole interroga
 
tion operation as purely routine, indicating that the
 
prisoner's role in it was of no real importance. In truth,
 
no enemy will spend time on a useless interrogation, for he
 
has more fruitful uses for his personnel.
 
Another deception device the Communists favored was
 
having prisoners write essays on subjects which, on the
 
surface, appeared to have no military or propaganda
 
significance: American banking methods, industrial finance
 
and management, journalism, bridge building, and the like.
 
The captors would show prisoners publications bearing on
 
these subjects and give the impression that they already
 
had the information and merely wanted to get the prisoner's
 
views. Some of these essays and statements were read over
 
the Communist radio in the enemy propaganda attempt to
 
convince the world that the prisoners were against
 
"American aggression;" others were used to blackmail the
 
prisoners into further acts of collaboration—-the prisoners
 
who had prepared them were told that they would be exposed
 
to their fellow prisoners or to the American "authorities"
 
as collaborators. This, of course, was despite the fact
 
that prisoners were Induced to write essays and confessions
 
partly by the promise that all statements and confessions
 
would simply be filed away, with signatures deleted, for
 
future educational use.
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2T HARASSMENT-^-Perslstent and annoying harassment was a
 
effective technique of interrogation, especially when the
 
prisoners were not aware that the harassment was, in fact,
 
a technique. A prisoner would be called to the interroga
 
tion room at odd hours of the day or night. He would be
 
awakened from his sleep, or summoned during a meal. Some
 
times he would be dismissed only to be recalled a short
 
time later. Many prisoners became exasperated and came
 
to believe that if they simply talked or answered the
 
questions they were asked, the Communists would let them
 
alone. In fact, it never happened that way—NO prisoner
 
who ever gave any information was let alone. After giving
 
an answer the prisoner would be pressured to explain it and
 
give details. Bit by bit he was led deeper into collabora
 
tion.
 
3. REPETITION—Although repetition is, in a sense,
 
harassment, the Communists considered it an independent
 
technique in its own right and used it as such. Going
 
over questions again and over their answers was wearing
 
and boring to the prisoner; but the interrogator would be
 
sympathetic, understanding, and tolerant. By going over
 
questions many times, the Communists were able to discover
 
whether the prisoner really had the sought-after informa
 
tion. This technique often broke down stubbornness-­
prisoners gave in and answered questions simply to escape
 
the exasperatingly patient questioning.
 
H. THE "201 FILE"--The Communists prepared files on each
 
prisoner and kept them up to date for reference when he was
 
summoned for interrogation. The prisoner was shown a
 
folder with his name and service number written in English
 
and Chinese, and told that the Communists knew all about
 
him, about his background, his family and all other impor
 
tant aspects of his life. The results of the initial
 
interrogation at the collecting point, the many forms he
 
had completed, and the pieces of blank paper with his
 
signatures were all part of the file. In addition, the
 
file contained information taken from letters he had
 
received and from those he had written, many of which the
 
Comfflunists had never mailed, and it was often enlarged by
 
the addition of blank sheets of paper. Faced with this
 
material and hearing the claims that the enemy had much
 
more information about him, the prisoner was likely to wilt
 
and give the enemy additional information.
 
This is an old technique which has been used by
 
many agencies throughout the world. To resist it, the
 
prisoner must retain his confidence and recognize the trick
 
that his captors are attempting to put over on him. The
 
enemy relies heavily on a prisoner's not knowing what is
 
117
 
happening to him in a detached situation such as capture.
 
The prisoner need only remember that if the enemy were
 
certain of all this information he would not be under
 
interrogation. The captor's prime goal is to get the
 
prisoner to talk in the knowledge that once started he
 
won't be able to stop. To thwart the attempt the prisoner
 
must keep his wits about him and his mouth shut.
 
5. WALKING CONFERENCE—It was common for an enemy inter
 
rogator to approach a prisoner and invite him to go for a
 
walk outside the prison compound. To the prisoner this
 
request seemed harmless enough, and a walk was a welcome
 
relief from the monotony of the camp routine. During this
 
walk the interrogator usually engaged the prisoner in
 
informal and personal conversation. The prisoner forgot or
 
did not fully realize that interrogators are chosen—by the
 
Communists as well as by the American Army—chiefly for
 
their ability to elicit information. Most prisoners found
 
this technique difficult to resist.
 
6. THE "MUTT AND JEFF" APPROACH-—A technique so old
 
that it is universally recognized by its nickname, the
 
"Mutt and Jeff" approach, which uses two interrogators.
 
The first acts ferocious and soon becomes enraged with the
 
prisoner, even to the point of slapping or kicking him.
 
If the prisoner is frightened into divulging information at
 
this point, the enemy has gained his goal with unexpected
 
ease. If not, another interrogator enters the room, often
 
acting as if he is superior in rank to the first. This
 
second man appears to become angry with his assistant and
 
may even strike him. Banishing him from the room--often
 
with threats of demotion or other punishment—the newly
 
arrived interrogator apologies to the prisoner. He says
 
that his assistant's behavior was crude, unsoldierly and
 
suited only to prisoners who are not intelligent. This
 
implies a bond between the POW and his questioner—they are
 
both intelligent, certainly more so than the crude assis
 
tant. Now the interrogator is free to turn on the friendly
 
appoarch, and the prisoner—often unaware of the trick—
 
lowers his defenses and starts to talk.
 
7. BIOGRAPHICAL ESSAYS—A Communist technique related to
 
the essays and to the 201 file was to urge the prisoners to
 
write long, comprehensive biographies. These were to
 
include practically every aspect of their lives up to the
 
time of their capture, and they proved a most profitable
 
means of gathering a vast amount of information. Through
 
this device the Communists obtained information even their
 
most skilled interrogators could not have gotten. As a
 
rule the initial biography the prisoner prepared was
 
returned repeatedly for additional details; each time the
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prisoner added a little more information in the hope that
 
it would satisfy his captor. Of course, so long as he
 
continued to supply information the Communists persisted
 
in their demands for more.
 
From the enemy's veiwpoint these biographies were
 
very helpful. First, they enabled the Communists to
 
categorize the prisoner, permitting them to tailor their
 
indoctrination approach to him. Furthermore, the captive
 
often gave information about other prisoners, rendering
 
these others vulnerable to the designs of the captors. The
 
enemy studied these documents very carefully, and often
 
called the prisoners back for clarification or amplifica
 
tion of the biographies. Some prisoners wrote as many as
 
500 pages of material about themselves, their hobbies, and
 
occupations and everything else they could think of. And
 
each time the prisoner "clarified" some point, he gave more
 
information to the enemy. One American wrote a total of
 
nine personal biographies. The "clarifications" the enemy
 
requested eventually included comments favorable to the
 
enemy and to his system. Communism, enabling him to bring
 
a great deal of pressure to bear on the author.
 
8. THREATS—Prisoners who prepared or signed personal
 
biographies or petitions made themselves targets for
 
coercive threats, for all such documents contained some
 
thing derogatory about our government or our army. When
 
the prisoner who had prepared such a document refused to
 
give more information, he was told that the documents he
 
had prepared or signed would be forwarded to the American
 
"authorities" for future legal action against him.
 
Although the enemy never did, take such action against an
 
American prisoner, most prisoners felt that the possibility
 
did exist. Such threats caused many American prisoners to
 
comply with endless requests for additional information.
 
Many other prisoners held out against such threats and were
 
not harmed.
 
Other implied threats worked to the enemy's advan
 
tage. By the time the prisoners arrived at the permanent
 
prison camps they had heard a great number of atrocity
 
stories and experienced the hostile atmosphere of capture.
 
The Communists tried to make the FOW believe that anyone
 
who resisted was sent away to be shot or worked to death.
 
Many prisoners interviewed upon their repatriation from
 
North Korea gave reports of resisters they were certain had
 
been killed. Investigation showed that the "dead men" had
 
merely been transferred to another camp, while the other
 
prisoners concluded from their disappearance that they had
 
been "eliminated."
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9. SELF-INDUCED FEAR—-In some instances American prisoners
 
were so terrified by their own imaginings of what would
 
happen to them during interrogation that their captors
 
didn't even need to question them. These men had
 
frightened themselves to the point that they poured out all
 
information they had the minute they were asked to speak.
 
Others, nearly as frightened, held out until the Communists
 
said that "it would be better" for the POW if he talked.
 
In their frightened state, these wretched men thought this
 
statement was a threat of all kinds of torture and unkown,
 
mysterious tragedies—-so they gave in.
 
Source: U.S. Army Intelligence Center And School,
 
Military Intelligence Subcourse 105: Examination
 
Of Prisoners Of War And Documents, Fort Huachuca,
 
Arizona, February 19b3 (Revised November 1974),
 
pp. 105;2;23-105;2;26.
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 17 Jan. 51 

20 Jan. 51 

22 Jan. 51 

25 Jan. 51 

1 Feb. 51 

12-18 Feb. 51 

Mar. 51 

15 Mar. 51 

31 Mar. 51 

11 Apr. 51 

Jun. 51 

14 June 51 

8 July 51 

5 Aug. 51 

11 Aug. 51 

23 Aug. 51 

25 Oct. 51 

27 Nov. 51 

12 Jan. 52 

Mar. 52 

China gives "outrageous and unacceptable"
 
reply to U.S. cease-fire proposal.
 
Chinese set up first permanent POW camp
 
near Pyoktong.
 
India submits peace proposal to UN.
 
Allies regain offensive; Asian-Arab group
 
submits Korean peace proposal.
 
UN General Assembly labels Communist
 
China the aggressor.
 
Communist counter-offensive.
 
Chinese brainwashing program begins.
 
Allies retake Seoul.
 
UN crosses 38th parallel again.
 
Truman removes MacArthur.
 
Soviet Ambassador to the UN suggests truce
 
talks should begin in order to end
 
hostilities.
 
UN takes P'yongyang.
 
Truce talks begin.
 
UN quits truce talks in protest against
 
propaganda violations.
 
Truce talks are resumed.
 
Communists break off truce talks; charging
 
air attacks on Kaesong.
 
Truce talks resume.
 
Agreement in truce talks on location of
 
cease-fire line.
 
Mig 15's (Russian aircraft) attack U.S.
 
planes for first time.
 
Brainwashing halts.
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4 Map. 52 

28 Apr. 52 

4 Sep. 52 

8 Oct. 52 

2 Dec. 52 

15 Dec. 52 

28 Mar. 53 

20 Apr. 53 

20 June 53 

27 July 53 

3 Aug. 53 

6 Sep. 53 

25 Jan. 54 

17 Aug. 55 

Secretary of State Acheson denies U.S.
 
used or is using BW on prisoners of war.
 
UN submits proposals on voluntary
 
repatriation of POW's to end truce
 
deadlock,
 
Truce talks in sixth week of deadlock.
 
Communists reject UN truce proposals;
 
negotiations postponed indefinately.
 
President-Elect Eisenhower goes to Korea.
 
Communists charges U.S. continues brain
 
washing POW's.
 
Red China yields on POW repatriation;
 
accepts neutral custodian for prisoners
 
unwilling to go home.
 
Operation Little Switch—149 sick and
 
wounded prisoners returned.
 
Communists discover that over 23,000
 
prisoners of the UN will refuse repatria
 
tion; 14,704 are Chinese.
 
Armistice is signed at Panmunjon.
 
Operation Big Switch begins.
 
Operation Big Switch is completed—3,629
 
American prisoners repatriated.
 
Final deadline for choosing to go home
 
passes for POW's declining repatriation.
 
Defense Department Report on POW's
 
released and "Code of Conduct"
 
promulgated.
 
Source: Bidermah, March To Calumny, pp. 283-285, plus
 
dates presented in this thesis.
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